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SIR STAFFORD CRIPPS IN INDIA

BY SIR FREDERICK WHYTE

THE Cripps Mission to India was the outstanding political event of the early Spring of 1942. It owed its significance to the evidence thus given of Britain's determination to leave no stone unturned in the endeavour to bring about a settlement both of the problem of India's part in the war and of the ultimate political destiny of the country. Sir Stafford himself was a good choice, none better; and the manner in which he discharged his difficult task showed that, if he could not succeed, no living man could hope to do so.

Now, it has been the fashion to speak of the failure of his Mission. In the strict sense of the visible result achieved, it is doubtless true to say that he did not succeed. None the less it is neither fair to him nor in accordance with the facts, to describe his endeavour as barren. Not only did he at a moment of critical deadlock in Anglo-Indian relations, transport the whole problem into a new climate of opinion, but he laid the foundation of a genuine settlement. It is not strictly true to describe either the unaccepted Declaration of His Majesty's Government, or the substance of British policy which it represents, as a radical departure from the main line of British purpose in India. The main Declaration was in its intention and in its terms the natural heir of the policy adopted by the British Government in its original Declaration of 1917, and in most of the political developments which have taken place in India since that date. The candid observer studying British policy both in the form of official Declarations made from time to time, and in the actual Statutes passed by Parliament, cannot escape the conclusion that the Cripps Mission, while a welcome novelty in manner and in the person of its performer, was actually an accelerated movement in a process of political evolution.

In what sense then can the situation be described as new? The Cripps Mission has now made explicit what was sometimes openly declared, but more often implicit in the statements of the British Government from time to time. But, more

pertinent and fertile than any exposition of policy is the fact that Sir Stafford himself created a new atmosphere. Since atmosphere and feeling are always more important than proposals and institutions (and nowhere is this truer than in India) it may be said that the chief novelty in Sir Stafford's achievement lies in the clearing of the skies and to some extent in the clearing of the ground as well. He has made plain, what was already known to those who have followed closely the course of British Indian policy in the past generation, that the real obstacle to further progress did not lie in the reluctance of the Government and people of Great Britain to recognize the political rights of India, but that it lay in conditions which are inherent in the Indian problem itself. It might almost be said that the result of his Mission has been to make the problem henceforth less one of Anglo-Indian controversy and more one which can only find its solution within the bounds of the Indian peninsula.

Let us look at the diary of events which led to the Cripps Mission. The war caught India in the middle of a difficult passage of Constitutional development. It provoked an old issue in a new and critical form. In law, India was at war when Britain was at war; and therefore constitutionally speaking no issue would arise. The enemy was at war with India and India was at war with the enemy; and from these inexorable facts there was no escape. None the less, much more could have been done, and should have been done, to give India the opportunity of going to war by a Constitutional act of her own, performed by and with the authority of her existing representatives. It would have been both feasible, tactical and wise to have provided the Legislative Assembly and the Council of State with an opportunity to declare by resolution the hostility of India to the Axis, the determination of peoples of India to cast in their lot with the Allies, and in the customary words of a Resolution by either House of the Indian Legislature, to "recommend to the Governor-General in Council that he do inform His Majesty of the purposes and desires of India thus expressed." Such action not having been taken, India, unlike the Dominions, automatically followed the United Kingdom into the war. Ordinances were passed giving wide powers to the Government of India over the Provincial Governments. These steps were taken without discussion in either the Central or the Provincial Legislatures as the Viceroy had sole power over Defence and Foreign

Affairs. On September 11, 1939, the Viceroy announced the suspension of the Act of 1935 owing to the war. The Congress Party were opposed to taking part in any war, save by the consent of the Indian people, and in August their members withdrew from the Assembly as a protest against the sending of Indian troops out of the country without the consent of the Legislature. On September 15 the Congress Working Committee issued a Manifesto protesting against India being declared a belligerent without her consent, and demanding the right of the Indian people to frame their own Constitution through a Constituent Assembly. On September 18 the Moslem League passed a resolution welcoming the suspension of the Federal part of the 1935 Act because its operation in the Provinces had resulted in the domination of Hindus over Moslems. On October 17 the Viceroy issued a White Paper giving the promise of ultimate Dominion Status for India and conveying the British Government's undertaking to consult with representative Indians at the end of the war with a view to modifying the 1935 Act. For the interim period the Government intended to set up a consultative group for "the association of public interest with the conduct of the war." As a protest against the shortcomings of the statement, the Congress Ministries resigned, while the Moslem League stressed the need for radical revision of the 1935 Act, in a sense congenial to the Moslem demand.

On January 10, 1940, the Viceroy again declared that "full Dominion Status in accordance with the Statute of Westminster" was the goal of British policy. To which the Congress Party riposted in March with the demand for nothing short of complete independence and the Moslem League by adopting the Pakistan Scheme. On March 12 the Chamber of Princes passed a resolution welcoming the promise of Dominion Status, but demanding the protection of their rights arising from any treaties, and safeguards for the autonomy of their States. On July 7 the Congress Working Committee again demanded complete independence and the establishment of a provisional National Government at the Centre. The Viceroy's "August Proposals" (August 8) invited representative Indians to serve on his Executive Council and proposed the establishment of a War Advisory Council, but both the Congress Party and Moslem League refused co-operation and a campaign of limited civil disobedience began.

On March 14, 1941, a Liberal Conference under Sir Tej

Bahadur Sapru submitted proposals for the immediate reconstruction of the Viceroy's Council to consist entirely of non-official Indians, and the transfer of the portfolios of Defence and Finance to Indians, and for an explicit declaration by the British Government of Dominion Status at the end of the war. In July the Viceroy created *three* new portfolios of Civil Defence, Information and Indians Overseas; and appointed *five* non-official, non-Party Indians to his Council. A War Advisory Council, including representatives from the Indian States but none from the Congress or Moslem Parties, was also set up. But these changes did not touch the heart of the situation; and on December 5 a direct appeal was cabled to Mr. Churchill (in Washington) from the Moderates urging him to act on their proposals of March, in view of "the gravity of the international situation."

So ended 1941. It was clear to all observers that a real deadlock had been reached. And while it might appear that the War Cabinet could release themselves from its grip by action designed to prove the *bona fides* of British policy in the sense of making the structure of the Government of India conform to the political demands of the Congress Party, such action would only resolve one deadlock by creating another, in the shape of the failure of the Congress Party and the Moslem League to accept a common solution.

At the same time a new element of mistrust entered the situation when the Atlantic Charter was described as "not applying to India." This statement was made, in perfect good faith, but without due regard to its reception by Indian Nationalists. It was made to seem as if the Charter were a boon denied to India, whereas it was evident that the Charter itself, except in the most general terms, did not declare its own application; nor was it primarily, if at all, designed to affect the circumstances of the United Nations including India. Doubt, if any legitimately arose, was due to the form of the Third of the Eight Points which declared that

> the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom . . . . deem it right to make known that . . . . they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live . . . .

The right seemed to be addressed to India; but the phrase immediately following:

> and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them

should have shown that the *whole* of the *Third Point* was conceived as part of a manifesto addressed to the victims of Axis aggression, and to no one else. None the less, India seized upon the words "the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live" as a new opening for a re-iterated demand; and it is probable that the Indian reaction to the interpretation of *Point Three* played some part in the decision to send Sir Stafford Cripps to India.

On March 11 Mr. Churchill told the House of Commons that Sir Stafford would fly to India forthwith bearing with him a draft Declaration by H.M. Government.

Now, we are still too near those eventful days in Delhi a month ago to be able to give a reliable account of what passed between the actors on the stage.* It is clear, however, from the Congress President's final letter to Sir Stafford Cripps (as also from the press reports of statements by Pandit Nehru and Mr. Rajagopalachariar) that there was doubt as to the essential point on which the breakdown occurred. No useful purpose is served by an attempt to apportion responsibility, especially since Sir Stafford has himself accepted it. This is an act of characteristic courage and generosity, but also a shrewd and wise one. Before this article appears in print, the public will know more, both from his lips and probably from a debate in Parliament; and until further light is thus thrown on the screen of moving events, comment must remain discreet and incomplete.

There are, however, three aspects of the Cripps Mission which stand out. The first is the reception of the Declaration itself, in which remarkably little was said about the essential manner in which His Majesty's Government proposed to meet the Indian demand after the war. This has created considerable surprise but it was due to the fact that, in the existing atmosphere of doubt about the *bona fides* of Great Britain, Indian nationalism attached greater importance to immediate action by which India would take her full part in the war, and by which the good faith of ultimate British intentions would be proved. The demand for immediate action apparently took the form of a proposal to appoint an entirely Indian Nationalist Ministry at the Centre—but how chosen, or how much responsible to the existing Legislature, is not clear. *Ex*

* For convenient reference the reader will find in the *Bulletin of International News, Vol. XIX*, Nos. 7 and 8, April 4 and 17, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 10, St. James's Square, S.W.1., the full version of the "Declaration" with a useful chronology.

hypothesi, a Ministry of this character would have no basis in law or constitution; for the demand was one which ignored the fact that the existing authority of Government in India rests on British law. The only way whereby this authority could be changed or transferred is by a new Act of Parliament. In form, such an Act would be a measure like any other; but in fact it would be an enterprise of such magnitude, in preparation, in discussion and in the process of passing it through all its stages in Parliament, that it could not be undertaken in time of war. It was this compelling reason that set the limits to immediate action, on the one side, under the Government's Declaration of March 29. The limits on the other were set by the Hindu-Moslem division which was sharply brought before the public once more in two cabled messages received by Mr. Churchill on March 8. The first, from the Hindu Mahasabha, demanded "a Proclamation of the Independence of India with co-partnership equal with Britain in an Indo-British Commonwealth." In the second, with equal emphasis, the President of the Moslem League urged the Prime Minister not to be "stampeded into a constitutional scheme" which would prejudice the Moslem demand for all that was expressed in the name Pakistan. Here the vicious circle was complete once more; and it remains to be seen whether on second and more mature thoughts, the various contending parties in Indian politics will realize that the Cripps Mission offered them a unique opportunity of new service both in war and in peace.

The second aspect of the Cripps Mission is to be seen in the comment upon it in the press of the entire civilized world (the civilized world not here including publications of the Axis Powers!), and especially in the United States of America. American opinion has always displayed active sympathy with Nationalist India; and, at every turn in recent constitutional controversy between Britain and India, the main volume of American press and platform comment has been at once critical of British caution and more than friendly to Indian desires. It seems almost as if the Cripps Mission had suddenly revealed to the American public the intricate internal complications of the problem of Nationalism in India and to have shown them that, compared with China, India presents a much more difficult task of fulfilment than any other in Asia. If India still hesitates to accept the good faith of Britain in India, it is hardly too much to say that the people of the United States are at last convinced.

The third aspect of the Mission is Sir Stafford himself. Though he is of sanguine temper, he cannot have supposed that his task in India would be simple. He did not, indeed, embark on it as a forlorn hope, but he knew from the onset that the tangible material was intractable and the intangible factors inharmonious. But he had countervailing elements to rely on. The visit of Chiang Kai-Shek brought the characteristic Chinese realism to bear on the Government of India and the Nationalists alike. The sound of Japanese bombs in Ceylon and Madras must also have had their effect. And his own personality and reputation were the best possible advance agents preparing the way for his arrival. These influences would surely have helped him to carry the day if there had been any real disposition in all parties to approach the problem in hand free from the freezing effect of past commitments, feuds and preconceptions. It was the dead hand of an evil inheritance from days gone by that strangled Sir Stafford's hopes. Yet he, being a man whose eyes and mind are set on the future could, even in the moment of defeat, speak of the immediate task ahead of India as not devoid of hope. He has indeed declared that the position now reverts to it *status quo ante*, meaning that the Declaration, which he was authorized to make, could not now be made; and that the structure of the Indian Government remains as it was before. In constitutional law and in administrative fact, that is true. But the situation of all the parties under that law is changed and cannot ever be the same again. To that change, even in the moment when he says "As you were!", Sir Stafford Cripps is living witness.

No British Government, of whatever colour, will ever go back upon the "Declaration" which, once made, carried the policy of Britain in India one long step nearer to its ultimate goal. Mr. Churchill's Government, or their successors, may have to retrace their present steps in order to find some other way to reach the appointed destination; but the main purpose will not be relinquished, nor the goal lost to sight. In that conviction, common to all or nearly all in the United Kingdom, I look for the next step, not in Britain, but in India. It is difficult to believe, though in truth nothing in politics is incredible, that India (if I dare speak of her as one person) will fail to see her opportunity to-day. What we have heard so far is not, it cannot be, India's last word.

CANADA—

Her contribution to the British Commonwealth and the American Continent.

By Rosita Forbes

CANADA is half of a continent as well as a nation. She has to cope with all the problems which are inevitable in a land of different races, creeds, traditions and historical backgrounds. There is no *one* Canada by whose example the whole sovereign state can be judged. Many and diverse peoples have created and are still vigorously contributing to her greatness. It is casually supposed that the Dominion which should be able to interpret Europe to U.S.A. and Washington to London, is divided into French speaking and English speaking citizens, each influenced by the land of their original stock. But there are large districts, especially in the Middle West where the average farmer or villager talks Polish or Ukrainian. There are also considerable numbers of Russians, Central Europeans, Scandinavians and in Vancouver, Japanese.

Many a factory to-day gives the impression of a League of Nations in miniature. The workers, whether men or girls, include types of every European race. I talked with Dutch and Germans, with Scots, Syrians, Norsemen and Slavs who considered Canada their own country. Their children were already Canadians. But some of the habits and ideas to which for centuries their peoples had been accustomed, endured with religion and language and at times with music, cooking or folk-lore.

Quebec Province is the citadel of the French-speaking Canadians, but there are many thousands of them further West. The greater part of Quebec Province speaks French, rigorously adheres to the Catholic religion, is dominated by its priests and to a lesser extent by its own local politicians, prides itself on villages and institutions solidly established for 300 years, but is—in fact—more sympathetic to modern Britain that to modern France.

The French-speaking Canadians represent more than a third of the Dominion's total population. With their enormous birthrate it is probable that within our own generation, certainly within the next, they will outnumber not only the British, but the sum total of all the other races in Canada. Therefore it is exceedingly important to understand their point of view. As a minority, they are the best and most tolerantly treated in the world. In Quebec Province, citadel of their ancient culture, of their earliest colonizing traditions and of their Faith, they have their own churches, schools and language, their newspapers and their provincial law.

Montreal is, to a great extent, the capital of French culture in all the Americas. In this decorative and interesting city there is a brilliantly sophisticated French civilization centring on the Universities, but dominated by a France which does not exist to-day. The free-thinking Republic has no part in the jealously guarded ambitions, traditions and purposes which make up the political and cultural form that is now French-speaking Canada. "We would like to be a completely independent nation with the same King and Queen as you have," is an occasional remark in Montreal or Quebec.

The broad international point of view is rarely expressed in French Quebec. As in the case of all minorities, however powerful, the local struggle for rights and privileges is apt to dominate the average mind to the exclusion of the most vital world problems on which the very existence of Canada may depend. Once anything has become a political issue, it ceases to be a matter of common sense. French-speaking Canada is as patriotic as any other part of the Dominion. There is no sacrifice that townsman or backwoodsman would not make to defend the land their ancestors discovered and on which their mark is so profound, but Canada to them is a separate entity which they find difficult to consider in relation to the rest of the world.

This is the explanation of the prolonged resistance to compulsory training for service abroad. First of all, it has become, in the minds of the general public, a political question. Secondly, it is only the active minded newspaper reading public of the towns and the railway-belt who can be expected to regard Singapore or Madagascar as in any way connected with Canadian security. Thirdly, if French-speaking Canada is to participate whole-heartedly in any form of compulsory training she must be assured of her own regiments and recruiting

officers. She must run her own publicity campaign. Her Church must approve and her own local politicians give a lead.

There is no impossibility about any of these things. Canadian priests have blessed this war as a Crusade. Many a French-speaking family has every able-bodied man in the Forces. It is only necessary to convince the ordinary people who, because of their own complicated local and political interests are averse to an international outlook, that Canada's defence is not limited to her own frontiers.

Meanwhile the Dominion has proved herself an invaluable ally. A young country faced by every problem, racial and material, she has taken up the Nazi challenge on four fronts. For while increasing her production of food and raw materials she has put about one-fifth of her total population into war-industry and multiplied her fighting strength more than thirty-fold. Her population is approximately 11½ million against the United States' 130 million. Her fiscal income was estimated last year at 6,000 million dollars against America's 90,000 million. Yet she has 350,000 men in the active armed forces, which in terms of her great neighbour's population would mean nearly 4 million. In the first two years of the war, she spent over 2 billion dollars including financial aid to Britain, which would mean something like 32 billion in the ratio of U.S.A. fiscal income.

Canada, as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations was free to declare war on the side of Britain, France and Poland, or to remain neutral with the United States and the other American democracies. Disregarding her continental, geographical and to a considerable extent her commercial necessities, she threw in her lot with the pioneers in this cosmic struggle for freedom. Mr. Mackenzie King justly stated the objectives of his sovereign country when he said on June 17, 1941, " our people went to war for the sake of Canada, but not for Canada alone. We went to war as well for the sake of Britain, for North American civilization . . . and for the sake of that humanity which is above all nations."

By his reference to the continent of North America, the Prime Minister showed prophetic consciousness of its indivisibility. For as India—whatever her future relationship to Britain—must be conscious of her Asian responsibilities, so Canada is aware of a dual destiny, linked with our Commonwealth and with the American continent. Logically, she is a part of the new world which should provide the pattern for

succeeding centuries. By blood she is British or French, Polish or Ukrainian. By nature and spirit, she is one thing only—Canadian. But her methods and range of business are American. So is her rapid, practical growth and the whole of her domestic and social life. She accepts American standards of production. The tempo of her living is no different from that on the other side of a frontier which may pass through the middle of a village street. Architecture, expenditure, habits or travel and entertainment, family budgets, wages, clothing and therefore appearance, possessions, household and commercial time-tables are duplicated in the two North American democracies. There is vastly greater wealth in U.S.A. but the pattern of life is the same. Consequently, apart from her geographical position which inevitably links her defence with that of the States, Canada has responsibilities to America as well as to the British Commonwealth. To both, she is essential. In both, she is obliged to play a leading part.

Neither Canada nor U.S.A. can remain unaffected if Russia proves to be the dominating factor in freeing Europe from Nazi-ism and becomes the model for a reconstructed continent. Already in the huge Manning Depôts where, between Atlantic and Pacific, youth of every race is being trained for the Air Force, there is continuous discussion of the new place and the new power to which the Soviet Republics will be entitled. After the air and the war, the most vital subject in the minds of tens of thousands—the young men who as pilots, observers and gunners come to us from Canada in an unending stream—is whether Russian successes to-day justify the last twenty-five years of Soviet policy. Admiration and interest are equally blended and the conviction is constantly expressed that "there must be a whole lot of good in a system which can put up such a fight in its own defence."

Before the war, Communism in Canada was theoretical among the intellectuals, and on occasions a bargaining counter among workers intent on higher wages. It is still far removed from a practical ideal because the whole of North America is accustomed to personal initiative and to a standard of living unknown in Russia. Individualism and mechanization are satisfactory in double harness. So there is no place at present for the harsh discipline and sacrifices necessary to the Soviet experiment. But if Europe is to owe her freedom and the model of her future existence to Moscow, North America must surely be the final test of democracy. Thus Canada becomes

as vitally important to the world as to the British Commonwealth.

By her position, she is the natural link between the English-speaking nations of Pacific and Atlantic, as well as the shortest air-road from the States—across the Pole—to Europe. In view of such 'sky-conversion' which means that, when problems of frost, moisture and de-icing are solved, the Arctic airways will be busier than the sea-routes of the last decades, Canada becomes the natural highway to China and Russia, countries which must play at least a major part in the destinies of Asia and Europe. Already the new air-way from Edmonton to the Yukon and Alaska is known familiarly as the "bomber road" to Vladivostok and—possibly—to Chungking. This is one of the Dominion's greatest achievements, for it shortens the distance between Chicago and Shanghai by 3,000 miles. If Hitler drives further East into the Caucasus and Japan invades India for the purpose of effecting a junction of the Axis forces, the threat to the whole N. American continent will be emphasized and also located. For in the extreme North West, the frontiers of Siberia and Alaska are only separated by a stretch of water scarce twice the width of the English Channel. Fortunately neither Canada nor the U.S.A. have been blind to this danger. Washington has spent fifty million dollars on a colossal air-base with an elaborate system equally suited to defence or offence at Fairbanks in Alaska. Canada has made a series of well-equipped aerodromes across Alberta and British Columbia so that, were the rugged coasts of N.E. Pacific threatened by Japan, within a matter of hours, a considerable striking force could be transported along the 'trail of 42,' the North West Passage of the future.

This 2,000 mile airway is likely to prove as historic as the Burma road. Already heavy transport 'planes are carrying troops and material along it to Alaska. In slightly more than five hours, the U.S.A. can now move a squadron of fighter 'planes from the Canadian border to what at any time may be a battle-front in the neighbourhood of Fairbanks. It takes eight days to send troops to Alaska by sea from the American port of Seattle, but eight hours' flying time suffices.

The inland route, East of the coastal range, was specially chosen by Canadian experts to avoid the heavy fogs which often blanket the Northern Pacific seaboard. It follows the 'Great Circle,' shortest route through the sub-Arctic to Asia

and passes over clear-weather country where both climate and altitudes are comparatively moderate. The Air Services' branch of Ottawa's Department of Transport had long foreseen the importance of such a route and had made surveys for airport sites in 1939. But the men who tackled the job a year later in mid-winter, with three feet of snow on the ground and the temperature thirty below zero, were the hard-bitten, tobacco-chewing bush-whackers who had already harnessed the rivers and broken the forests of the bitter North West on a score of mineral raids. The plans called for main aerodromes at Grand Prairie, Forts St. John and Nelson, Watson Lake and White Horse in the Yukon. The first two and the last were near enough to railways to eliminate the worst transport problems. But Fort Nelson was 300 miles North of anything and Watson Lake was a pinpoint on the map in the middle of wilderness and muskeg bogs.

Tractor train No. 1 started from Dawson Creek and the final edge of civilization on February 9, 1940. The first section consisted of a "bulldozer" or battering ram for hewing down trees and cutting the tops off hillocks, with a caterpillar engine hauling several cabooses, which are wooden huts on sleighs, and two bunk houses for the crew of twenty-eight. The second section comprised a blacksmith's shop and five sleigh-loads of heavy materials. Mile by mile the tractor train cut, pushed and flattened its way into the bush. Sometimes it achieved ten miles in twenty-four hours, more often only three or four. At the end of a week working without pause it had covered over thirty miles.

Then Spring began to break. It was much too early, but ice thawed and the heavy tractors crashed through into swamp and had to be hauled out again. It took nearly two months for the first party to reach Fort Nelson. They had seen nothing living but wolves.

The Summer campaign necessitated floating reinforcements and equipment from the port of Wrangel in Alaska down the Stikine and Dease rivers. This meant 350 miles by rocky waterway with seventy-five miles of portage through solid bush. As soon as ice broke on the rivers barges were loaded with trucks, tractors, grading-machinery and two saw-mills with their equipment. At times the crews had to wade in the still freezing water and dig out rocks to widen or deepen the bed. But everybody and everything reached Telegraph Creek safely and a shipyard was set up at the other end of the portage

where—on Dease Lake—power-boats and larger barges were built for the next river stage. Then came a final haul through forest, breaking a road with the tractors that had journeyed in sections from Wrangel and were put together on the spot. So, 400 miles from the coast, some of Canada's toughest pioneers, making history instead of the fortunes of the gold-rush, reached Watson Lake and erected their sawmills. With the bush timber they built their houses and boats. Their spare stores they cached on high platforms to keep them from grizzlies while they prospected. Then the airport was planned and created by men living in complete isolation. To-day there are five modern airports with 4,000 feet runways, radio and weather stations, beam apparatus and lighting facilities for night-flying in all weathers over country hitherto unseen by anything but eagles. The States' huge Flying Fortresses on their way North to Alaska—perhaps North West to Vladivostok, Russia's strongly fortified naval and air base on the Pacific—use the re-fuelling facilities of White Horse. Once a trappers' and trading post, this small, alert town is growing as quickly as any wartime camp. It is one of the busiest places in the North, with a swallow population speaking most languages, bound for the most startling destinations. For White Horse is the key to the whole Northern airway system linking two continents and a dozen potential fronts.

Canada, too, has turned many hundred acres of plough and pasture-land into the most modern buildings of concrete, steel and glass. She started production before the roofs went on, and covered an army of machines at night with tar-paper and sacking. She experimented with men who dreamed new tools and made them as if on another day of Genesis. She called upon all her craftsmen, and in three months instead of three years gave them some idea of how to make guns and tanks which they themselves had previously never seen! It was a struggle of enthusiasm and determination against inexperience. And the old-timers of to-day responsible for 'shops' or foundries an eighth of a mile long with perhaps 3,000 of the most modern American machines engaged in straight line production, were the victors of those first battles to *invent* the necessary material.

Within the last few months I visited enormous plants making rifles, shells, boilers for fighting ships, trench and smoke mortars, parts for every kind of weapon and army vehicle, which prided themselves on machines that had not stopped

for a consecutive hour since production began. I saw dock-yards built on reclaimed land by river or great lake, with a dozen or a score of war-ships on the slips, which had been waste ground in the Summer of '39.

I found about 50 to 60 per cent. of the total workers in light industry were women. They came from offices, shops and domestic service and they spoke of having "stopped worked when war began and taken on a job." I was told that it took six weeks to make the average Canadian girl "tool-minded" and that when she had learned her particular machine she stuck to it and was "better than a man at repetitive routine stuff for she had more patience and could endure more monotony." Inspection of separate parts and of finished weapons or munitions is done largely by girls who have graduated in science from the Universities.

Except for the office staffs, I saw no women employed in heavy industry or in shipyards and on the whole I imagine their factory infiltration is not yet on such a large or general scale as in Britain. But it was officially announced early last winter that another 200,000 women would shortly be taken into war industry to release men for even more "active service."

The industrial front in Canada is already a vital advance post so far as the Allied Fighting Forces are concerned. For continuous shifts are working night and day. Some of them last ten hours with men and women giving voluntary "catch-up" service during their "lunch-periods" when very often they can be seen standing beside their gigantic hydraulic or mechanical presses still in action, with a sandwich in one hand and a bottle of milk in the other.

At this moment Canada is spending on armaments and transport five times as much per day as in 1914 to 1918. In the last war the mechanical transport of an infantry division consisted of 153 vehicles. To-day it comprises 3,500 motor vehicles of 160 different types. The cost plus upkeep of this armament under battle conditions for one year is twelve million Canadian dollars as against the two million necessary in the last war when 4,400 horses supplied the major part of an infantry division's transport.

More than 150,000 army vehicles have already been delivered from Canadian factories and are in service, the larger proportion overseas. It is calculated that the premier Dominion is producing one automative unit every three minutes day and

night. Among the most important is the universal carrier, in essence a baby tank which travels up to forty-five miles an hour on caterpillar tracks, manœuvres easily on almost any ground and is equipped with machine guns. One Canadian plant alone produces enough of these carriers every day to equip a battalion and in a fortnight sufficient for an infantry division. Between Atlantic and Pacific, the Dominion is making fourteen different types of gun, heavy and light tanks which are already in action on several fronts, shells and other munitions in astronomical figures. She is building corvettes, mine-sweepers and freighters, twelve different kinds of bombers, fighters, transport and training 'planes, using on the latter her own spruce and birch, a good deal of her own steel and incidentally her own glue made from milk. She is turning out every form of equipment from gauges and optical instruments to flare parachutes and gas decontamination suits or to marine smoke floats and anti-submarine gear. While doing this with no lessening of effort in field and forest, on which we largely depend for food and timber now that our European sources are closed, she is patrolling two seaboards prodigiously indented and stretching to the Arctic. Up till last November Canadian sailors had shared with British the task of convoying 40 million tons across the Atlantic. Since then the Dominion's work has been doubled by Germany's systematic attack on lone ships in North American waters. The result has been a waiting-list of five thousand for the Dominion Navy, Coastal Command patrols co-operating with U.S.A., and the establishment of an effective 'shipwreck pool' near the busiest port on the Atlantic seaboard to which all the survivors of Axis torpedoings in Canadian waters are taken. The reports of these men from every part of the Commonwealth and the Empire, from Scandinavia, the Balkans, the Low Countries, the Middle East and South America, from every land which still ventures on the sea under the flags of freedom, are systematically collected and compared. The information thus collated is sent to Naval H.Q. and it has proved the value of the quick, collective analysis by which it was induced.

So Canada fights and works, fulfilling her part of the allied programme from which she has never been deflected. So is she preparing to play an equally important part in the reconstruction of a world which may be regional and federal rather than nationally isolationist.

POST-WAR TRADE AND BRITISH EXPORTS

By Joseph A. Kronsten

FROM the many schemes for post-war world trade some guiding principles seem to emerge. Those most widely advocated demand large economic units with free economic intercourse within their frontiers, an internationally planned distribution of staple goods, stabilized currencies and, above all, a wholesale abolition of trade restrictions whatever their nature and purpose.

One notion of the several popularized by Dr. Schacht will presumably survive, *Grossraumwirtschaft*, the economy of large territorial units. There is little doubt that post-war trade will mainly be between large economic units such as Great Britain and the Empire, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and China: and, too, the European and Latin-American continents may be organized as a small number of federal, confederated or economically interlinked states.

On the other hand it is hardly likely that these large new units should be able at a stroke to introduce unrestricted trade within their respective boundaries. Even in a comparatively homogeneous area like South America there are differences between the countries sufficient to prevent an immediate and indiscriminate unification of their economic systems. This is even more true of Europe where the issue will be additionally complicated by political considerations and the programme of reconstruction. Can the U.S.A., where inter-state trade discrimination still persists in the guise of public health and security regulations, be quoted as an example for a territory like Eastern Europe, where for instance, the average 1937 pig-iron consumption per head of population amounted to 1.8 lbs. in Bulgaria as against 239.0 lbs. in Czechoslovakia? It appears therefore that the abolition of tariffs "in one lightning stroke," recently advocated by Mr. Oswald Dutch in his *Economic Peace Aims*, whether between the large economic units of the future or within their respective frontiers, would in many cases be practicable only if a rigid system of quotas were enforced instead.

With the question of tariffs and quotas we embark upon the key problem of post-war trade, namely, whether the inevitable systems of restrictions should have a commercial or a financial basis. In other words, it still remains for us to decide whether there ought to be a free flow of goods within a system of rigidly interlinked national currencies or a system of free and independent currencies at the cost of severely enforced quotas. We have to sacrifice either freedom of trade to freedom of exchange or *vice versa*: the former solution is mainly favoured by financial circles and the latter by merchants and some manufacturers.

The "free exchange versus free goods" controversy is in fact a three-cornered issue, since many advocate a common currency within each of the large economic units at least. But radical cultural and political changes will have to precede international collaboration close enough to produce common monetary standards: until they are adopted multilateral clearing arrangements are perhaps the best temporary device for regulating inter-state trade within each of the large units. The working scheme suggested years ago by Professor Milhaud and the London Chamber of Commerce might no doubt be brought to light again for this purpose.

The post-war distribution of commodities still appears a gigantic jig-saw puzzle: but it is possible to foreshadow some extensive, internationally administered or at least internationally advised scheme for dealing with it. It may be assumed that existing or temporarily dissolved cartels will be used as instruments of a planned world trade system. But it is unjustifiable optimism to anticipate idyllic international Round Table committees of producers and consumers with statistical surveys of consumption and stocks as the panacea for mismanagement and extortion. Collaboration with consumers' representatives such as that practised by the International Sugar Council and the International Rubber Regulation Committee is, as yet, rather exceptional. It is doubtful therefore whether an all round international cartel system could be enforced without much state or inter-state interference at the beginning and a large measure of permanent control.

While, as Mr. Lyttelton cautiously put it some time ago, "import control may have to be maintained for some years after the war," much of the trade in the first two post-war years will fall into the Relief Programme class, already comprehensively planned by the Inter-Allied Committee under Sir

Frederick Leith-Ross. The development of the war may still greatly widen the scope of the Relief schemes: they should however prove insignificant in comparison with the rapidly growing flow of normal, that is, "remunerative" trade, provided that sound economic measures are universally adopted.

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The first unknown factor is the qualitative and quantitative contents of post-war international trade. Since the war started almost all countries have had to embark upon new ventures in mining, industry and agriculture or considerably enlarge their existing ones, the belligerents in order to increase their war potential and the neutrals to make up for the loss of their customary sources of supply. In both cases it would be ridiculous to expect a return to the *status quo.* Just as the last war left England an economic legacy of the dye-stuffs and sugar-beet industries, a number of others lately developed here and elsewhere have definitely come to stay.

The Dutch diamond, the Viennese leather and the Paris fashion trades recently established in England can be regarded as representative of the many refugee enterprises which so vividly remind us of the Huguenot factories that sprang up in this country and others as a sequel to another great persecution. History shows also that refugee industries seldom leave their country of adoption and there is no reason to expect an exception to this rule.

The problem of re-converting the tens of thousands of war-factories in this country and the U.S.A. and throughout Europe will also affect considerably the range of post-war international trade. In many cases the switch-over will have a direct effect on the import requirements of particular countries, in others it will be felt indirectly: there should be for example a colossal expansion of air transport on account of the change from military to civil aircraft production. Similar though less conspicuous changes are bound to affect agricultural production. Millions of reclaimed acres will remain under crops for good. Afforestation can absorb only a fraction of the surplus land, and to turn it back into marshes would be as foolish as difficult. Thus both the qualitative and quantitative features of world trade are likely to show considerable and permanent changes.

It is far too early to predict the actual ways and means of carrying out the Relief Programme mentioned. We do not even know if the countries now occupied will obtain direct

supplies or credits to effect purchases themselves, and whether the commercial side of these deals will be negotiated by their respective governments or left to appropriate business agents. In any case, the more comprehensive the schemes for bringing relief to Europe, the greater the chance of getting the Continent back to normal. This time however raw materials and industrial equipment will be of no less importance than food and clothing: and saving the Continent from its economic paralysis means business, not charity. For, as Professor J. M. Keynes stressed so clearly in his *Economic Consequences of Peace*, " there must be imports before there can be exports."

In the earlier stages of post-war economy we shall probably see a considerable amount of barter trade, transacted or sponsored by particular states. War conditions have of course encouraged barter transactions on both belligerent sides and among the neutrals. The U.K.—U.S.A. pioneer rubber-cotton deal has been followed recently by the U.K.—U.S.S.R. diamond-platinum transaction, and the pitiful trade between neutral and subjugated European countries is being conducted to-day mostly by means of barter agreements.

Should no satisfactory solution of the world's monetary problems be reached in time, barter may prove the most practical way out, at least in regard to foodstuffs and other staple commodities. This will tend to handicap private enterprise in view of the difficulties of financing, storing and transporting the large quantities of goods exchanged. Organizations like the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and the U.S.A. Export-Import Bank seem predestined agents for such deals.

Here again we are touching the crux of the whole problem: who is actually to run the entire complex machinery of international trade, or, let us say, of the world trade in foodstuffs, raw-materials, semi-manufactured goods, means of transport and heavy machinery? Should we live to see a universal adoption of industrial and, probably, agricultural output quotas, the schemes in question ought simultaneously to provide export markets to absorb the surpluses expected. The agent to handle these exports would be either the manufacturer himself, an industrial organization such as an export group or a trade association or some kind of state agency.

International groups of producers and distributors of every important class of merchandise might well manage to gain control of planning and management of the various sections

of trade. But in order to operate efficiently there would have to be either a compulsory enrolment of members or a ruthless discrimination against outsiders, and an internal struggle for power and profits would be unavoidable. Therefore, except in the case of groups particularly favoured by trade conditions there would most likely arise a *bellum omnium contra omnes*, strikingly similar to pre-war conditions.

The first period of post-war trade should be a genuine boom in which the clash of interests would not be obvious. However once the consuming markets had satisfied their long-accumulated requirements and laid in extensive stocks for fear of shortage a new crisis might arise unless internationally organized precautions were taken in time.

The Committee for Political and Economic Planning has recently advocated the adoption of a differential system of commodity prices depending on the purchasing power of poor, undeveloped or war-stricken countries. Thus, with a fuller share in world trade, they could gradually afford to pay normal prices for their import requirements as their economic recovery or development proceeded.

While state intervention in the field of trade *sensu stricto* may be accepted because of its temporary or limited character, it is likely to prove most expedient in regard to the international transport and storage systems. The re-mobilization of world transport, the delivery and distribution of relief and other bulky supplies, the setting up of regional commodity stocks, the improvement of the existing system of general and special storage, are all tasks that will call for state or interstate financing and control. It may even be asserted that state control, though not exactly state ownership, of the transport and storage system to be re-organized or modernized after the war would prove the best means of state supervision of international trade.

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This country's position in the post-war era will unfortunately not be an easy one. To prove that no illusions are cherished in responsible quarters, let us quote both the promise of the President of the Board of Trade that "everything will be done to preserve our post-war trade" and the warning uttered by the President of the Federation of British Industries that "export trade once lost is extremely difficult to regain."

Britain's industry, with more than 300 branches of production concentrated already on supplying war needs, cannot be expected to readjust itself quickly to economic conditions of peace as different, maybe, from those of 1938 as from these of 1942. Moreover, a considerable number of shippers, export merchants and agents have had to quit business with the loss of most of their overseas markets and with their normal wares no longer available for export. In spite of the undoubted advantage of amalgamating smaller export interests, the amount of goodwill and direct commercial contact lost as a result of war conditions is obvious enough.

Another serious feature is the inevitable shrinking of Britain's overseas investments, which not only constituted one of the pillars of her balance of payments but also attracted British goods to many countries. Similarly British shipping is likely to find itself at the end of the war with its carrying capacity diminished, both in terms of actual tonnage and through conversion for war purposes, need of repair and reconditioning and so on. The unfavourable effects of the war on British banking and insurance are bound further to weaken the tissues of Britain's balance of payments, whilst an immeasurable amount of damage has already been inflicted on the United Kingdom as the *entrepôt* of world trade.

On the other hand, all the Dominions have considerably strengthened the basis of their future enconomic expansion. Chains of new industries have sprung up in the Dominions, most of them with guarantees of post-war development bestowed upon them in their very cradles. In view of the industrialization of the Dominions, now in full swing, they may be expected to dispense in future with a great many imported goods regularly featured in their pre-war import trade returns. The same applies to India, Palestine, Egypt, etc.

The economic system of the U.S.A. will probably be less affected than that of this country: the future alone can show too whether New York is a mere "reception area" for the intermediary trade and finance evacuated from London or whether this transplantation is designed for longer than the duration. Whatever the case may be, we have to face the *fait accompli* of inter-American economic collaboration, resulting in the entrenchment of U.S.A. exporters in South and Central America. The process of industrialization will also have altered the character of Latin-American markets and a growing proportion of their requirements is bound to be supplied

within the South American trade system. China, of course, must in due time become one of the world's most important economic units: it will take the place of Japan who with the loss of her Asiatic possessions will gradually sink into a mere dependency of the Far Eastern economic system.

The thoroughness with which Russia sacrifices both her population and her wealth for the sake of a common victory is bound, unfortunately, to handicap her post-war trade. The deterioration of her agricultural, mining and industrial output and of her transport and power systems as a result of the destruction already wrought may make Russia a liability rather than an asset to the world economy for several years. But should she receive all the assistance required, Russia may, perhaps, prove less reluctant than before to collaborate genuinely with the outside world. How this would widen the range of international trade can best be illustrated by comparing the value of foreign trade per head of the population (1937-8 average) amounting to 1.32 U.S. dollars in the U.S.S.R. as against 85.50 U.S. dollars in England.

Germany on the other hand will have to undergo a painful process of re-adapting her industry to peace-time conditions: this might however be greatly facilitated should the final phase of the war take place on German soil and be followed by an intermediate period of semi-anarchy. It would of course be necessary for her to return to the rightful owners all the industrial plant, machinery, means of transport and storage, etc. looted on the Continent. Military guarantees imposed on Germany together with the psychological reluctance of her present victims to avail themselves of her commercial services might cut out the bulk of Germany's *entrepôt* trade. This should have a beneficial effect on European trade since instead of linking, Germany has always divided Western from Eastern Europe, while her " economic mission " has amounted to distributing cheap overseas commercial credits at extortionately high profits to herself.

Eastern Europe, an area with immense economic possibilities, will then be able to enjoy the full benefits of world trade, its rising level of consumption opening a vast new field for British capital, goods and initiative.

France may only gradually recover her lost position: having never aimed at becoming the centre of European commerce she will presumably concentrate mainly on the economic development of her empire. Close collaboration between Holland,

Belgium and the Scandinavian states seems probable, while Italy should be able to range herself advantageously with France.

The solution to the post-war trade problem lies either in commercial collaboration between the U.S.A. and England or in their competition. The better course is obvious, but while wholeheartedly endorsing Mr. Winant's slogan, "collaboration without discrimination is the corner-stone of reconstruction," we should desire nothing other than permanent collaboration, even if it implies economic concessions and trade sacrifices on both sides. A comprehensive agreement with the U.S.A. would entail probably Britain's withdrawal from Latin America except for selected classes of export in return for the United States restricting themselves merely to selected exports to imperial markets. Joint U.S.A.—British commercial expansion, based on trade specialization rather than on a division of markets, would have a great mission to fulfil in the Far East, the Middle East and Russia, while Europe would become closely interlinked with the British economic system. None of these schemes of course is meant to suggest predominance of the U.S.A.—British combine to the detriment of the legitimate interests of either customers or competitors. Latin America and to a lesser extent the U.S.A. will naturally continue to supply the Continent with many of its products although the centre of European trade would be fixed more firmly than ever in this country, the economic link between Europe and the overseas markets.

A vital change in the mentality of British exporters is an important condition of their future success. The adoption of the decimal system of weights and measures and of international trade denominations, a greater interest in foreign languages, customs and local conditions, and an improvement in the commercial intelligence service, both private and official, are indispensable to the British exporter embarking on his difficult and responsible post-war tasks. Furthermore, action and sacrifice ought to be regarded as sheer necessities with Great Britain short of invisible exports and faced with the post-war alternatives of export or pauperization.

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PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AS A NATIONAL LEADER

By D. W. Brogan

THIS handsome and admirably edited collection of documents* would, in normal times, interest the student of political science, the expert in American affairs, the modern historian. These classes will find their needs admirably catered for, but the four volumes of Mr. Roosevelt's *Public Papers* deserve and will get far more attention from the common reader than they would have had in more normal times. The reason is not far to seek. Over each volume the shadow of Nazi megalomania is thrown longer and longer; in every volume the uneasy tossing of the American giant in his sleep brings him nearer to the complete awakening of December 6, 1941, one of the turning points in the history of the world.

There is, of course, in all the volumes, even in the last, much that concerns internal American politics only. The President did not allow his increasing absorption in the ways and means of defeating the German menace to weaken his interest or his pride in the New Deal. When a great new dam site was dedicated at Chickamauga in 1940, scene of one of the bloodiest battles of the Civil War in 1863, Mr. Roosevelt did not forget what the Tennessee Valley Authority had set out to do and had done in the way of economic and human rehabilitation. In his campaign speeches, he did not forget that the New Deal had paid special regard to the needs of the common man, to that " one third of the nation " that is, in the striking American term, " underprivileged." This concern for domestic issues is, of course, more obvious in the earlier than in the later volumes. The excesses of judicial review, the blind and dangerous conservatism of the Supreme Court, are more the theme of the 1937 volume than is the Nazi danger. But even the 1937 volume has its high-water mark in that " quarantine " speech at Chicago which was, alas, ahead of American opinion.

With 1938, the year of the *Anschluss* and Munich, the centre of interest moves eastward and outward and, thenceforward, the main task of the President of the United States is to prevent the outbreak of war, then to keep the United States out of the war when it breaks out—but to

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secure that the United States is not left alone to fight the last, desperate battle of freedom in a world dominated by the pirate and robber states. This is the most living theme of the last three volumes. It recurs in messages to Congress, in appeals to rulers of states, in appeals to American public opinion and in the frank editorial introductions and notes that the President has contributed. And it is the main theme of what is the most novel feature of these volumes (novel here, as the previous series has not been published in Britain), the reports of the Presidential press conferences. Here we see the President explaining, answering, debating the issues and news of the day with the Washington correspondents of the great American newspapers and some of the most illuminating comments on events, some of the most revealing reactions, are in the *obiter dicta*, on or off the record.

We have set out here, candidly though openly from one side of the question, the history of recent American foreign policy, of the attempt to save America from the grim realities of the modern world by optimistic legislation, a characteristic political superstition of an excessively legally-minded people. We have here the President's regrets for the aid and comfort he gave to this superstition by signing the various neutrality acts. And we have the records of the unavailing attempt to alter that policy in 1939 when there was still ground for hope that Hitler could be made to hesitate by such an alteration. (One of the most impressive relevant documents printed here is not by the President, but by Mr. Hull).

The attempt to repeal the Neutrality Act while Europe was still nominally at peace failed. But, war once declared, the President tried again, this time with success. The arms embargo was repealed and the so-called "cash and carry" policy adopted. It may not seem very important now, but it was thought to be very important then. And those who thought it important were right, for the repeal of the Neutrality Act showed that, once faced with the danger of a Hitlerite victory, the American people was ready to do what then seemed enough to ensure his defeat. What then seemed enough, not more. For like ourselves, the American people are human and continued to hope for an easy way out of the bad situation in which they and the world found themselves. How bad it was they did not understand in the apparent lull of the winter of 1939-1940. Neither did we; neither did our rulers and in clarity of vision and foresight, the leader of the American people shone by comparison with the then rulers of Britain and France. If the invasion of Poland and the outbreak of war did not surprise the President or, probably, most of the American people outside Congress, it is evident that the President's sense of urgency did not communicate itself to the people as long as the "phoney war" lasted. The war was remote;

the American people was not neutral in sentiment; it detested Hitlerism far more unanimously and warmly than it had detested Kaiserism in 1917; but it was not an American interest that was at stake—or so the man in the street—and in the Capitol—thought. Or, rather, American interests were not in danger, for there was no doubt that Britain and France would win and teach the paperhanger a lesson. This illusion was fostered by the politicians like Senator Nye who had denied the reality of the crisis, the reality of the war, the existence of any danger to America. It was fostered by the more ingenious Nazi propagandists who did not waste their time on imitating the tactics of "The Link", in trying to convince the American people that Naziism was a good or tolerable thing. The conviction that Germany, however evil, was not really formidable, was the American attitude that best suited Hitler's book. And of course, all these dangerous illusions were encouraged by the Communists and their "fellow travellers" who denounced the imperialist war, spread the slogan "the Yanks are not coming" and did the work of Berlin more effectively and zealously than direct agents of Goebbels or Bohle could hope to do it. It was this dream world that was shattered by the *Blitzkrieg* in France and the Netherlands, after being threatened by the invasion of Denmark and Norway. And that process of shattering is admirably illustrated here.

The threat of a Europe dominated by Hitler and of an Asia dominated by Japan produced mixed reactions. One which is of some importance at this moment is the spontaneous view, natural in a people to whom seafaring is now a minor interest, that naval defence means the stationing of naval forces near the American coast. It is an old enough story. In the Civil War, especially in moments of great strain like that produced by the victories of the *Merrimac* over the wooden Federal ships, there was a panic demand for stationing vessels off New York or off Philadelphia or off Boston. Such demands were a plague to Lincoln and to his Navy Secretary, Gideon Welles. Less justifiable was the odd panic that struck Boston in 1898 when the alleged approach of the Spanish Armada under Admiral Cervera induced the more excitable of the solid citizens of Boston to transfer their strong boxes inland to Worcester (Mass.). And the Cervera panic of 1898 has been repeated to-day, with the senior Senator from Massachusetts, Mr. David Walsh, with the due authority attaching to his position as chairman of the Senate Naval Affairs Committee, asking for the withdrawal of the American fleet into home waters. This is to make not command of the sea but ineffective command of the coast the aim of naval policy and here we are shown President Roosevelt at a press conference explaining the indivisible character of naval war. On May 14, 1940, before the full weight of the German attack could be estimated, the question was discussed at a press conference. The President objected more than once to the phrase "a

two-ocean Navy . . . because it is not sensible to talk of naval defence in those terms . . . Of course you are supposed to have a Navy that will go anywhere for national defence purposes, and no human being can say where it will have to go—nobody."

And the dialogue continued, with a topicality of a painful reality to-day "Isn't it conceivable we may have to split the fleet if something happened out in the Netherlands Indies and then—" but the President replied, "I am afraid that is a leading question." But he went on:

> If you break things down in those terms, we ought to have Navy ships in the mouth of every harbour to protect that harbour against any possible attacking for us because, you see, they might attack Portland, Maine, and Boston, Massachusetts, at the same time. Now, wouldn't that be awful? You really ought to have two navies.

But if the President had a firm grasp of naval realities (a far more practical view of the necessities and possibilities of the case than had some publicists and politicians, not to speak of the man in the street) in the early summer of 1940, no one in America yet understood the full implications of the *Blitzkrieg*, of the revolution in the scale of mechanized war. Politically, the President was fully alive to the realities of the world of gangster states. He pointed out that thirteen and a half months had elapsed from the American entry into the last war and the first appearance of American troops in action. The United States would not be allowed this long breathing space in a new war. "We were completely free from any attack. Now, that will never happen again in the history of the United States. As far as I can see that was just a bit of sheer luck." Perhaps the President's opponents would not have objected to the view that it was luck, but they held the view that "God looks after children, drunkards and the United States." Pearl Harbour was the answer to the optimists.

But what was involved in full preparation for modern war was not fully appreciated in Washington, even in the White House. On May 26, 1940, with the crisis and the Battle of France at hand, the President gave out some comforting figures. They would have been comforting before May 10, before the immense weight of German might had been revealed. There had been great progress since 1933.

> In 1933 we had only 48 modern tanks and armoured cars; to-day we have on hand and on order 1,700 . . . In 1933, on the personnel side we had 1,263 army pilots. To-day the Army alone has more than 3,000 of the best fighting fliers in the world, who last year flew more than one million hours in combat training.

The *Luftwaffe* and *Panzer* divisions that destroyed France, the immense weight of men and metal that bent but did not break Russia, make these figures rather pathetic. And the belief that America could rearm without a fundamental reorganization of American industrial life, as an extra, not as the main job of American industry, what may be

called the Knudsen theory, has died hard. The President explained that the new orders for tanks were on a scale that made their provision by regular Army contractors, like the Baldwin Locomotive Company, impossible.

> You cannot build a tank with an automobile outfit. They let, the other day, that contract—what was it?—$50,000,000 for medium tanks to Chrysler. My Lord! He has to put up a new plant for it . . . . He gets a $50,000,000 order, $30,000,000 for tanks and $20,000,000 for a plant. I suppose it will take Chrysler a great many months before he gets that actually into full production.

"He had to put up a new plant for it." That was the Detroit attitude. For if existing plants were used, they could not produce cars, the real business of Detroit, and if they did not produce cars, how would America move, live and have her being? It was not an unnatural attitude or one to be too complacently condemned. And when the effect of American entry into the war is estimated, it should always be remembered that only that entry, only the insult of Pearl Harbour, could have made it possible to enforce such an economic revolution as the suppression of new cars, new radios, new refrigerators. The American people had to be angry and feel itself both humiliated and endangered before the mental readjustment, the acceptance of the view that power comes before plenty and is the essential condition of plenty, could be reasonably expected. After all, it is only now, well on the way to our fourth year of war, that the great national industries of betting on horses and dogs is seriously threatened. If we seriously interfere with the extremely elaborate and, in war-time, wasteful organization that provides the necessary mechanism for the improvement of blood-stock, we shall be doing something comparable to the American acceptance of no new models in cars or domestic gadgets.

In 1940, it must be remembered that the American people for all their passionate interest in the war, for all their generous admiration for the spirit of Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain, still thought of it as something to be kept away from their door by policy, by foresight but above all by resolving that it should be kept away. Like all democratic societies, political stress on the value of the people's will had bred a superstition that you can, if you are rich and intrinsically powerful enough, have what you want if you really want it. We had and indeed have our own stiff dose of political Coućism to repent of and to pay for. Neither Britain nor the United States had appreciated the deep wisdom of Mr. Dooley's dictum that you may refuse to like a man, to be his friend, to hate him, to lend him money, but if he insists on a fight "you have got to oblige him."

The illusion of unlimited freedom of choice died hard. The President was forced to reckon with it. American sentiment, like American

legislation, was firmly set against the sin of re-entering the war of 1917. Don't do what was done between 1914 and 1917 and all will be more or less well. So there had to be political promises like: "We will not use our arms in a war of aggression; we will not send our men to take part in European wars . . . But we will repel aggression against the United States or the Western Hemisphere." So the President spoke in a message to Congress sent on July 10, 1940. It was a promise—and it has been kept. The United States has been the attacked, not the attacker and it is in a world war, with battle raging in every quarter of the globe, with American ships being sunk in sight of the shore, with the California coast territory being shelled and with American troops fighting a brilliant but uneven battle on what is still American territory, that Congress has removed, without a discussion, all restrictions on the use of American troops. The Axis is everywhere; so must the anti-Axis be, too.

But the year 1940 showed, in an unprecedented fashion, how seriously the American people already took the crisis. They did not as yet fully understand its meaning, but they recognized its existence. For the election of President Roosevelt for a third time was a demonstration of this crisis mentality whose dramatic character was naturally underestimated in Europe—though not, one may be sure, by the rulers of Germany, Italy or Japan. The strength of tradition in American political life and, especially, of the tradition against giving any President more than two terms, can hardly be appreciated by a European who does not know the country at first hand—and even such an observer will only note the strength of the tradition, he will not feel it in his bones, as almost all Americans do. That President Roosevelt consented to run again, that he was nominated and elected, were the greatest proofs of the success of the educational efforts of Herr Hitler. But almost equally dramatic was the nomination of Mr. Wendell Willkie who had voted the Democratic ticket as late as 1932, who had never held any political office and who yet was given the Republican nomination over veteran, skilful, and cautious politicians, some of them fairly young in years, but old in political arts. It was because those arts were too obvious and too irrelevant and that statesmanlike caution too terrifying in a year of destiny like 1940, that the rank and file Republicans forced the nomination of Mr. Willkie.

Mr. Willkie's candidacy, of course, is not adequately illustrated in these documents; what is recounted is rather the incidental and semi-farcical sides of the campaign like the throwing of a cantaloupe at Mr. Willkie at Detroit, where later a British Ambassador had to endure the trial by ordeal of that missile-minded city. But Mr. Roosevelt, of course, could not campaign so long or so thoroughly as did Mr. Willkie.

> I told the people, told the Convention that night on the air, about midnight, that whether I liked it or not, I happened to be the President of 130 million people, the United States and dependencies—territories— and things are in such shape this year, that it is, of course, perfectly obvious that I cannot do any campaigning as you all know.

It did not quite work out like that. Campaigning is a duty for a President who is running for re-election and it was just as well that the American people were given a full education in the personal and administrative issues involved for, fortunately, there was no fundamental difference in foreign policy between the two candidates. There were vivacious exchanges of charges and counter-charges, but the campaign of 1940, from the point of view of the believer in democracy, was one of the most hopeful indications of the capacity of a great people to choose a course of action and to choose a leader. And it was in this spirit that on the eve of the election, the President, in his last campaign speech ended with a prayer, " that, through obedience to Thy Law, we may show forth Thy praise among the nations of the earth. In the time of prosperity, fill our hearts with thankfulness and in the day of trouble, suffer not our trust in Thee to fail. Amen."

When the election was over, the President thanked his supporters—and those who had opposed him but who, the popular will once expressed, had sent " pledges of loyalty and support . . . . These messages, in particular, reflect a spirit of national unity in essential things which is most welcome. In union we shall find our true strength." And it was to that spirit of union that the President appealed in his fireside chat of December 29, and in his message to Congress of January 6, 1941, almost the last documents of this series: " In the recent national election there was no substantial difference between the two great parties in regard to that national policy." And what was the policy ratified by the millions who voted for Mr. Willkie as well as by the millions who voted for Mr. Roosevelt? An acceptance of the truth and the implications of the truth that

> principles of morality and considerations for our own security will never permit us to acquiesce in a peace dictated by aggressors and sponsored by appeasers. We know that enduring peace cannot be bought at the cost of other people's freedom.

Because the American people and their leader made that decision, Berlin and Tokyo were forced by the logic of their own ambitions and their own desperate needs to strike in the dark. But as they were wrong about the spirit of the American people, they will be wrong in their estimate of the fruits of treachery. As the record of the growth in American determination and American power, in American understanding and American purpose, these volumes will have as great a historical as they now have a topical value.

CO-OPERATION OF THE SERVICES

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

THOSE who before the war were so misguided as to believe that the Navy and Army had lost much of their importance in war and thought that the strengthening of the air arm was the only thing that really mattered, must be now convinced of their mistake. The situation in the Far East has obviously arisen from our lack of adequate naval strength to meet our world-wide commitments, and it has been made worse by lack of strength on land to protect air bases. No increase of air power alone would have enabled us to check the Japanese onslaught.

The Navy is and must always be the primary factor in our defence and of course the air weapon is an indispensable part of its armament. Only the Navy can give the Army and R.A.F. the strategic flexibility which minimizes the necessity of their dispersion and enables weak detachments to be reinforced as circumstances demand. Those who proclaimed the flexibility of air force appear to have failed to realize that this flexibility is confined to the tactical sphere and that strategically it is almost as dependent on land and sea communications as are armies. That must remain so until air transportation reaches standards of efficiency and range that are not yet in sight.

The Army depends on the air weapon quantitatively to an even greater extent than the Navy, and that is probably the most valid argument for denying the Army a specific air component, sufficient to meet its maximum requirements. For it would obviously be uneconomic to lock up in a separate compartment a large proportion of air power designed solely for direct co-operation with land forces. Air power undoubtedly has an important independent rôle both defensively and offensively which requires training, equipment and organization which has little in common with what is needed for co-operation with the Army. But just as it would be uneconomic to lock up too large a proportion of the air power for purely army co-operation, so also is it a mistake to maintain an undue proportion trained and equipped for a purely independent rôle.

Whether the Air Force should be treated as a separate Service as is the case with ourselves and Germany, or as a part of the Army as is the case with Japan and the U.S.A., seems from experience to be largely immaterial. Either organization can clearly be made to work satisfactorily provided there is efficient higher control. What has apparently been lacking in our organization is higher control strong enough to ensure that the Air Ministry should

tach as much importance to the co-operative rôle of the R.A.F. as to its dependent rôle. It is now generally admitted that the *Luftwaffe*, although independent organization, developed its co-operative functions to the ut- ost without apparently reducing its powers of independent action. milarly the Japanese Air Force, though an integral part of the Army, is ident quite capable of independent action.

It has of course been argued by many people that what we need is a com- ned General Staff of all three Services which, while leaving the Services parate, would improve the higher control which the Chief of the Staffs mmittee, though a step in the right connection, does not fully exercise in any matters. The main argument against such an organization is the vious difficulty of providing personnel of sufficient all-round knowledge and perience; especially since in naval matters there is a multitude of problems ich do not affect the other Service and which require a highly specialized aining to appreciate. With these latter arguments I confess I entirely mpathize, and have always felt that the demand of the Navy for complete sponsibility over all aircraft, whether shore-based or ship-borne, specially signed and trained for operations against or for the protection of shipping ould be its responsibility, is fully justified. No doubt it would be econom- al and advisable in specific localities and circumstances to train a proportion the R.A.F. for shore-based co-operation with the Naval air force so that e latter could be reinforced quickly when the situation demanded it. Such aining would naturally be carried out by attachments to the naval ganization.

That leaves us, however, with the problem of securing higher control of -operation between the Army and R.A.F. As matters stand I am not an vocate of amalgamating the two Services; it would undoubtedly imply a ng period of soreness and friction. On the other hand, there seems to be a rong case for establishing a combined General Staff of the two Services, nctioning continuously and in one building. Such a combined staff would less cumbrous and much easier to fill with personnel of the necessary perience than a combined staff of all three Services. Its main function ight be to ensure the co-operative training of the two Services, and it ould include a dual inspectorate to ensure that co-operative training was ficient. At the same time it would, I think, be advisable that it should have me control over the planning and intelligence staffs of the individual Ser- ces, in order to ensure that there is no waste of effort on independent actions hen maximum co-operation is required. For instance, the bombing of rgets in Germany when maximum co-operation was of vital importance France is now generally admitted to have been a mistaken application of dependent action. Similarly no army operation should be planned without e certainty that adequate air co-operation could be provided. The questions provision of suitable aircraft for army co-operation, of the most effective

anti-aircraft ground defences and protection of aerodromes would al naturally fall within the scope of the functions of the combined staff. Mai tenance of liaison with the Admiralty would of course be of the first impor ance, but that might be provided by Naval officers attached who could bri to notice all points on which the Admiralty must be consulted. Combin operations in which all three Services might be engaged must obvious require special consideration as regards training for them, provision specialized equipment and the planning of specific operation. For that suggest there be a permanent sub-Committee drawn from the dual gener staff and with additional naval representatives. For the planning and exec tion of specific operations the Sub-Committee would probably require co siderable *ad hoc* expansion, or it might be dealt with by a combined sta specially constituted.

The appointment of a chief of the dual combined staff might possibly rai difficulties. Each of the three Services must clearly have its own chief the staff and it would not be easy, or advisable, for any one of them to com bine his duties with that of chief of the combined staff. But from wh Service should the individual be drawn? It certainly might be argued th he should be an army officer, because the Army can do comparatively litt to assist the Air Force beyond forcing the enemy to offer targets for attac whereas co-operation of the Air Force with the Army is always indispensabl The Air Force is the producer, the Army the consumer, and the consum must be satisfied. Furthermore the organization and problems of the Arm though less specialized are more complex than those of the R.A.F. Yet it worth recognizing that once an air force chief of the combined staff w convinced that co-operation was not all that it should be he would probab be able to exercise more influence in his own Service than would an arm officer. As a working compromise selection might be made, in peace time least, from the two Services alternately, as was the practice adopted selecting the commandants of the Imperial Defence College. Naturally time of crisis or war the Government would not be bound by such procedur

The Chief of Staffs sub-Committee, with the Chief of the Combined Sta as an additional member, would presumably continue to act as advisers the Government on all matters of general military policy, and it would pr vide an opportunity for the head of an individual Service to make represent tion as regards orders issued by the Combined Staff from which he dissente

There are reassuring signs that the Services are making great efforts ensure a better standard of co-operation, but that all is not yet well is impli by a statement Sir James Grigg is reported to have made the other day to t effect that, "although the Air Ministry was satisfied with the improveme made the War Office was not"—a difference of opinion that often maintai between the producer and consumer. Libya, fortunately, has provided magnificent training ground and there the men on the spot have worked o

eir own salvation. It is not easy, however, for others without constant ractice and effort to apply the lessons learnt.

Everyone is ready to give the Air Ministry full credit for the magnificent andards the R.A.F. has attained and for the quality of its equipment. It nnot be said, however, that there is such general satisfaction with the use e Ministry has made of the weapon it has created. It is not denied, I think, at the R.A.F. Staff began the war in the belief that independent air action ould prove the main instrument in achieving victory. That belief might ve proved justified if France had held out and if air power had been allowed restricted action, but it now has few supporters. Yet the influence of the elief appears to remain in an unwillingness to admit that co-operative action at least of equal importance, and that it requires training complicated by e necessity of acquiring a knowledge of the methods and problems of another Service.

It will not, I hope, be thought that I consider that co-operation between e Navy and the other Services is of secondary importance; but it is of a fferent order from that of R.A.F. and Army co-operation, especially now at the Navy has its own air arm; and it would become more so if the Navy quired full responsibility for the air coastal organization.

What I have written refers mainly to operational co-operation. The roblem of higher strategic direction to ensure the best combined effects of e actions of the three services, influenced as they often are by political and conomic considerations, is different and more complex. Is there not a case or dealing separately with the two problems which often tend to be confused?

COMMAND OF THE SEA

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

SINCE the entry of Japan and America into the war the essentiality the command of the sea to us, always great, has been more forcil brought home to the man in the street, though it does not yet appe to have made a decisive impression on those responsible for the ma direction of our strategy. Although there has been no want of understandi of fact that the Atlantic sea route is a "life-line, the sea lines of commu cation have now shown a heightened importance. The fall of Singapore, d fundamentally to the loss of command of the sea and its acquisition by Jap has been followed by the appearance of Japanese naval forces in the Indi Ocean, the occupation of the Andaman Islands as an advanced base f operations against Ceylon, the Indian ports on the Coromandel coast, t trade of the Bay of Bengal—which is presumably now at a standstill—a as a stepping stone towards the route from the Cape to the Red Sea a Persian Gulf. Our loss of command of the sea has enabled Japanese nav aircraft (and it will have been noticed the aircraft are integral units of t Japanese Navy and that this does not appear to have diminished the efficien or the flexibility of the air arm) to operate in strong forces in the Bay Bengal, inflicting on us the serious losses of the cruisers *Dorsetshire* a *Cornwall* and the Aircraft carrier *Hermes* and also a bombardment of t naval base at Trincomali. The Japanese armies in Burma can now supplied by sea through the Burman ports, an advantage in the transport their heavy supplies of munitions and food which we, who have so oft profited in our foreign wars from our ability to furnish our armies with the needs by way of the sea will be the first to recognize. The many lines, to of communication of other Japanese armies—those in the Philippine the Dutch Islands and in the approaches to Australia—are able to proce without serious interruption. Lines of communication—as a recent cartoo of Low's showing a monkey hanging from a palm leaf by its tail, mark "communications" and reaching out with one paw for a nut denoted "India and with the other for another "Australia" concisely expressed th situation—are the master-key to the situation in the East: and one of th locks is Ceylon.

Elsewhere the lesson is that communications dominate the issue. It no less plain in the Mediterranean where the fortunes of Rommel's—a

achinleck's armies depend on the use of the cross-Mediterranean routes to bya and Egypt or Palestine: hence the heightened activity of the Axis air rces in their endeavour to render the air fields of Malta and the harbour Valetta useless or untenable and to break the spirit of resistance of the ople of Malta. For the flotilla forces operating from those airfields and eeks are the principal obstacle and hindrance to an adequate supply of men, nitions and food to the Axis army. So too we have seen an attempt made the Italian navy, making one of its rare appearances at sea, and of the forces of the two powers, to destroy a British convoy carrying much needed pplies to the island: an attempt most brilliantly defeated by Admiral Vian d his small cruiser and destroyer force. In the Dodecanese and in Crete a assing of material is reported, transport aircraft, gliders, landing craft, small aft—suitable for a crossing of the sea and an attack, or attacks, on Egypt, prus, Syria, Palestine or Turkey. The line of military communications in e Levant is obviously one of the vital areas in the forthcoming campaign.

In the North it is the same. There we see the intense desire of the enemy cut the line of American and British supplies to Murmansk. Attacks on is line of supply have been conducted throughout the winter, and an attempt capture the port of Murmansk and so close that channel was launched, with eat expectations of success, in November: the early fall of the port was retold by the propaganda machine. But both the attacks by aircraft and " boats on the convoys and the land assault failed. Now the matter has come more pressing as the volume of military supplies has steadily in- eased with the increased output of the allied factories and the scale of tack has developed. Not only " E " boats, aircraft and mines are employed: eavy ships, destroyers and submarines in combination with them are now use. So on March 9 the battleship *Tirpitz* made her first reported appear- nce from Trondheim to attack a convoy, but put back to port after being tacked, though unfortunately in small force only, by aircraft. A few days ter (March 14 and 15) a running battle was fought by the British escorting quadron of destroyers and motor gunboats against a force of " E " boats in hich the Germans lost five of their " E " boats and the British the destroyer *ortigern*. A fortnight later enemy destroyers, submarines and aircraft tacked a convoy on its way to Murmansk when off the north of Norway. he engagement began with air attacks off Tromso. These were beaten off the aircraft of the fleet air arm and the fire of the vessels of the convoy nd escorting force. Two destroyer attacks by flotillas from Tromso and rondheim followed, in turn defeated by the cruisers and destroyers of the scort with a loss of one destroyer by the enemy and, finally, a last attempt stop the convoy was made off Kola itself by a combination of dive bombers om Kirkenes and Petsamo, submarines and destroyer flotillas, in which ussian aircraft from Murmansk joined in the defence of the convoy.

All convoy operations tend to bring about a battle. The advantage lies

with him who anticipates his opponent in the provision of superior force. the last war the attacks on the Norwegian convoys began with small forc of destroyers, which wiped out an escort. Then came an attack by tw cruisers which destroyed the *Mary Rose* and *Strongbow*. Then the escor were strengthened by cruiser and battleship forces and in April, 1918, t High Sea Fleet put out to intercept and overwhelm the detachment. So no the enemy appears to intend to create as strong a force as his means adm consisting of the *Tirpitz*, the two battlecruisers recently returned from Bre as soon as they shall have been conditioned for service again, the two remai ing " pocket battleships " and presumably such of his cruisers as are availabl in fact, a " battlefleet " of all arms in which we may be sure aircraft will figur No pains will be spared to bring this force up to the greatest streng possible, and the lessons which are to be got from the Japanese use of ai craft will not pass disregarded.

Thus we have three main areas of military sea-communications—t Pacific, the Mediterranean and the North Sea and Arctic. Command of t sea is the only foundation of success in those campaigns and that foundati must be laid both quickly and surely. It cannot be repeated too often th the first object in British warfare must always be to obtain this comman which, if lost—as we see it lost in the Indian Ocean—spells disaster not on in that theatre but in others as well.

The part played by aircraft, in the Eastern campaign in particular, has be of decisive importance. Two British battleships, two large cruisers and a aircraft carrier are the price that has been paid by the navy for the want air components in the fleet. That ships can be effectively guarded again aircraft by aircraft was shown by the episode of the running of the gauntl by the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* and *Prinz Eugen*. Whereas those three shi were effectively defended in their run up channel, even against the who available strength of the British air forces of the various commands in t southern area, there was no such protection given to the British battleshi off Malaya or the cruisers in the Indian Ocean, neither of which were attacke by forces so numerous as those in the Channel. It is indeed no small shock t read that the *Hermes* when attacked at, apparently, no great distance from t coast of Ceylon, though she was not taken by surprise and was expecting t attack, received no support from shore based aircraft in the island. It is no over four months since Japan entered the war, and during those four mont we have been told of numerous bombings of factories and harbours in Ge many or German occupied territory, accompanied by no small losses of ai craft. We are told too that our air forces have now reached high figures. Y not enough have been spared to give the navy the support which the pla evidence of facts shows that it needs to enable it to contest the command the sea, that vital element in our strategy. An offensive against the centr of production of German war material in Germany and elsewhere is undoub

ily an aid to Russia; the destruction of the Renault motor factory was a ow the effect of which can hardly fail to injure the mobility of the German my up to a point. But if such blows, useful though they may be, are fected only at the expense of the loss of the command of the sea by which ie advance of Japanese armies into Burma and India is facilitated materially; for want of British air action at sea British fighting ships are lost and panese fleets—of which the aircraft are integral units—are able to attack ie trade of India and link up in the Indian Ocean with a German movement rected against Egypt and the Middle East; and if communications with urmansk are cut or seriously interrupted in the period of prolonged day-ght that is now ahead of us; if these and other unfortunate occurrences ould take place, then it can only be said that there will have been a most rievous misuse of our air strength. "Hard blows," Mahan once wrote, "are seless unless aimed at the right spot." The blows on the Ruhr, on Ham-urg, on Lubeck and Cologne have doubtless been hard and have effected no nall damage to the interests centred in those districts. But the blows which apan, by her command of the Eastern seas, has been able to strike at Great ritain, have been harder, and that those blows have been possible to her has een due in part to the insensate reductions of the Navy by the Treaty of ondon and in part to the absence from the British navy of a sufficient, pro-erly equipped and trained naval air force; of those units, in other words, with hich Japan has struck some of her principal blows. It is surely time that ose who direct our strategy should have become aware of the simple princi-le, so well known to our ancestors, that our first object in war is to obtain ommand of the sea and that all arms of the fighting services capable of taking art in the struggle for command should be devoted to that object. In the uilding of a house the first thing that is done is to lay a solid and assured oundation. The walls follow. Command of the sea is the foundation upon hich the fight for the defeat of the enemy must rest. One thing at a time a good maxim, taught us in our copy books and preached and practised by very great master of war. Dissipation of effort in two or more efforts is a ontradiction in practice to this fundamental principle.

While the events in the three areas referred to above have occupied a prom-nent place in the minds of most of us and in the columns of the Press the other reat area across which vital supply routes run, the Atlantic, has continued to e the scene of a hard struggle. That struggle has not slackened though it ay have changed its position. The developments in the defence by means f an increased number of small craft and of aerial fighting craft appeared o have driven the enemy further to the westward, but the Prime Minister ad to tell us that the Atlantic situation had worsened—temporarily, it was o be hoped. German submarines have been active in what seem to be large umbers and operating, with the help of supplies from places on the American ontinent, in the Caribbean Sea; and it is not to be forgotten that some thirty-

five per cent. of our oil supplies come from the Dutch West Indies, a sour which becomes of greater importance since the loss of the supplies from th East Indies. The American coastal routes are now being attacked, with th effect that a considerable number of small craft, greatly needed in the Pacif theatre of war, must be employed in the protection of those routes which a an essential element in the distribution of goods between New York ar the districts to the northward and southward.

The fine actions fought in defence of the convoys in the Mediterranean ar North Sea show the skill and courage of the fighting forces and what th can do, even against heavy odds. The raid on the dock gates at St. Nazai is no less a fine example of planning and execution. It was so efficiently pr pared and so boldly and skilfully conducted that one can but regret that s little of like nature has been done, and on a larger scale, during the two and half years of the war. It is not difficult to visualize the possibilities open the employment of a strong force of all arms, like that which undertook th attack at St. Nazaire and consisting of men highly trained, provided with th necessary anti-aerial artillery, guns, the means of transport and landing craf but on a far larger scale. From the Levant to the North Cape the positio of the enemy would be kept under a constant threat and subjected to a succe sion of assaults. We heard something of "commando" brigades some tim ago, but except for these comparatively small and occasional attacks in No way, on the Libyan coast and at St. Nazaire they appear not to have be used. Have they been dispersed? The cry from Russia for a diversion grow louder. Difficult as it is, particularly in the present state of our shipping, open up what is called a "western front" on a large scale to meet the deman it can hardly be beyond our power to repeat, on a scale larger than those the raids hitherto executed, similar diversionary attacks of which the effe has been to cause no small uneasiness and the tying down of troops in th west. Nor would this be inconsistent with the doctrine of seeking to obta command of the sea. Wolfe's remarks on the capture of Aix have the appropriateness to the situation of to-day.

> The Ministry of England do not see that to possess the Isle of Aix with five or s battalions and a fleet is one of the most useful strokes that this nation can possib strike. It stops up at once the harbours of Rochfort and Rochelle, obstructs and ru the whole trade of the Bay of Biscay, inevitably brings on a sea fight which we ought b all means to aim at, and is the finest that can be made with a small force . . .

As convoy movements should always be recognized as the means of forcin the enemy to sea and thus furnishing the opportunity to strike him a heav blow, so the combined operation, conducted with the heavy forces in readines to fall upon the attacker, tends to serve the same purpose and play a part, Wolfe saw, in gaining the command of the sea without which we shall with and perish.

THE USE OF "ATOM-SMASHING"

By C. H. Waddington

IN 1937 Lord Rutherford published one of the last lectures he was to give, under the title "The Newer Alchemy." It was a proud claim but it was justified. The old alchemical dream, of the transmutation of one elementary substance into another, had been achieved. At first it depended on the use of the spontaneous transformations which were known to occur in radio-active substances, and one could claim that the physicist had merely discovered a method of directing a natural process of change on to the materials which he wanted it to effect. But later, in the years just before 1937, the process of transformation had been brought about by completely artificial means, and the last ground on which one could dispute the physicist's claim to have found the philosopher's stone had disappeared.

The public could hardly fail to be impressed, even when it became clear that the apparatus and power necessary for success were exceedingly costly and the quantities of material affected extremely minute, even when the first flush of enthusiasm wore off and it was obvious that as a method of turning lead into gold, the procedure was not within a thousand miles of being "business." The sheer mastery which such an achievement implies was still so impressive that probably few people dared to murmur "But is it any use?" They need not have been so bashful. The process of transmutation has already found practical applications of considerable importance within the few years which have elapsed since the discovery was made. It has, in fact, been turned to good account more rapidly than most fundamental physical discoveries. It took fifty years for Faraday's discovery of the principle of electromagnetic induction to bear fruit in the first public electricity supply operated by Edison. There was nearly as long an interval between the original discovery of the principles underlying radio and their practical utilization. But perhaps these enormous time-lags are only suffered by new techniques which try to enter the commercial field. The electric dynamo had to fight the steam-power interests; and radio came into fierce competition with wired telegraphy and telephony. The "Newer Alchemy" was more lucky. Its practical application lies largely in the field of medicine, where the battle is not so easily won by the big financial battalions and the advertiser who can shout loudest.

The discovery of the artificial transmutation of elements turns on the previous discovery of isotopes. It is usual to picture the atoms, of which elementary substances are composed, as consisting of a small heavy nucleus, in which most of the mass is concentrated, surrounded by a system of very light, negatively-charged electric particles, the well-known electrons. The more sophisticated inhabitants of physical laboratories are no longer content with such a simply visualized model, but for our purposes it will serve well enough.

The existence of isotopes is based on the fact that, as might be expected, the chemical behaviour of one atom when it comes in contact with another is determined by the number and disposition of the outer layers of electrons, whereas its mass is dependent on the heavier particles which lie deep within its nucleus. It is therefore possible to have two or more types of atoms with the same chemical properties but different masses; and they are called the different isotopes of the same element.

The essential procedure in the artificial transmutation of a substance is to alter the configuration of its outer layers of electrons. This cannot be done in a permanent way by treatments which merely affect these outer layers themselves, for they are in electrical equilibrium with the inner nucleus, and if this equilibrium is disturbed, it soon becomes restored during the interaction of the atom with its neighbours. A genuine and permanent transformation can only be brought about by an alteration in the electric charge on the nucleus, since this, lying so throughly shielded by the outer layers, cannot, as a rule, easily change back into its former condition. But the very fact that the nucleus is so closely guarded makes the technical problem of affecting it a very difficult one. It can only be done by bombarding it with small particles moving at extremely high speeds. The great advances in physics in recent years have depended on the development of the massive "atom-smashing" machines capable of speeding up particles sufficiently to enable them to disrupt atomic nuclei. The problem is essentially an engineering one—of harnessing currents running into millions of volts. It was first successfully tackled by Cockcroft and Walton in Cambridge; but the cyclotron, the newer apparatus developed by Lawrence of California, seems now to be the most satisfactory appliance for the purpose.

Although the nucleus of an atom which has been knocked askew by a fast moving particle cannot easily react with any other atoms in its neighbourhood, it may be spontaneously unstable owing to an internal lack of equilibrium. This is the basis for the most important practical application of atom-smashing. If the nucleus of an atom becomes unstable it will, after a longer or shorter period, break down into a more stable form; and while it does so, it gives out what may be regarded

as the superfluous material, in the shape of one or more rapidly moving particles. It behaves, in fact, like radium, spontaneously shooting out of itself a characteristic type of radiation. The important point is that by the new method of transmutation, one can manufacture a number of radio-active elements which are isotopes, that is, have the same chemical properties, as many of the common atoms which we usually come across in stable and non-radio-active forms.

As soon as the production of radio-active forms of common atoms became practicable, the medical profession became interested. For of course it is well-known that the rays given off by radium are of great therapeutic importance. The fast moving particles of which the rays consist are highly injurious to the complex chemical substances on which the activities of living cells depend. One can say, in a rough way, that the more intensely alive material is, the more sensitive it will be to radio-active substances. In particular, tissues which are growing fast suffer greater damage than more slowly growing ones; and hence the wide use which can be made of radium (and of the somewhat similar X-rays) in the treatment of cancer, which is, after all, mainly characterized by the excessive growth of the cancerous tissue. Natural radium is such an extremely rare and costly substance, that the artificially produced radio-active substances can compete with it, in spite of their comparatively high cost and of the small quantities which can be made, although they would be quite out of the running as substitutes for any other class of substance.

But the artificial products, like several of the modern *ersatz* substances, are better, and in some ways very much better, than the original "genuine article." Radium itself is both very rare, so that one cannot afford to lose any of it, and is not a substance with which the human digestion is normally called upon to deal. The only way of bringing it into the neighbourhood of a cancerous growth is therefore to seal it into small tubes or "needles," and to place these, usually by means of an operation, into the required situation. With some of the new radio-active substances, a much easier and much more efficient method is sometimes possible. One can, as we have seen, prepare radio-active forms of many of the common elements which are contained in ordinary articles of diet. Now the different tissues of the body have different chemical requirements, and absorb, out of the digested food substances, much more than their fair share of the particular elements which enter into their special composition. For instance much the highest concentration of iodine in the body is found in the thyroid gland, where it is used in the production of the thyroid hormone; and if a dose of radio-active iodine is administered, some of it is soon passed out of the body again, some spreads throughout all the tissues, while in the thyroid

quite a considerable quantity may accumulate. By selecting a suitable dose, one can so arrange things that it is only in the thyroid that the concentration of radio-iodine becomes large enough to produce any noticeable effects. Instead of having to perform one troublesome operation to introduce the radium needles into the right place, and another to remove them, a treatment which is, effectively, completely localized can be given merely by administering a suitable radio-iodine pill.

The natural localization, which depends on making skilful use of the body's own processes, has greater advantages over operative procedures than mere simplicity. Some types of cancer are caused by excessive growth of cells of a particular kind which are not strictly confined to one organ, such as the thyroid gland, but are scattered all over the body. For instance, in the cancer-like disease known as leukemia certain of the cells floating in the blood multiply too rapidly. There is no way of putting a radium needle in contact with them, since they are continually moving all over the body; the only conceivable hope would be to catch them at the place where they are first formed, which is in the marrow of the bones, but even that is clearly almost impossible in practice, since the insertion of a needle into the marrow of every bone would be altogether too much of a good thing. But the problem can be solved with radio-phosphorus. Bones, of course, contain a large amount of phosphorus, and one would expect some of the radio-phosphorus given to a patient to reach his skeleton; but, luckily enough, phosphorus is also required by rapidly growing cells, and it therefore becomes concentrated in any growing cells floating in the blood. Again, one can achieve in this way just the localized application of radioactivity which is required. Dr. Lawrence, of the Crocker Radiation Laboratory in California, who invented the method, claims that it is "a simple method of giving localized whole body irradiation in a single cocktail"—a truly spectacular advance in medical technique, and one wonders whether even the fast-moving Americans could yet bring themselves to call such a cocktail an Old Fashioned.

As a matter of fact, this method of administering artificial radioactive substances has only been used in medical therapy for a year or two. The results so far obtained are still to be regarded as promising beginnings rather than as the achievements of a completely mastered technique. But as far as they go they are very satisfactory. By the radio-iodine method it is already possible to reduce the growth of the thyroid gland to any extent which seems necessary, and the radio-phosphorus technique has given the physician an encouraging degree of control over blood and bone cancers.

Experiments with other radio-elements are also giving some promise

of useful results. Radio-strontium is, like radio-phosphorus, mainly stored in the bones, but unlike that substance it does not affect the blood cells to any great extent. It is being tried for use in patients with bone tumours. But the preliminary steps in the introduction of a new treatment are laborious and need very careful and cautious work. One has first of all to find out where a given element goes to in the body, and then to test the effects of different doses of it. The first stage, the problem of where an element becomes absorbed, can be fairly easily investigated by the use of the artificially radio-active substances themselves. In fact, this was the first use to which they were put in biology. Previously it has not been at all easy to follow the course of a given substance through the processes of digestion, absorption and excretion. The best one could do was to feed an abnormally large quantity of a substance and look for any local concentrations of it, or of substances which the body might make out of it. But one could never be quite sure what interpretation to put on the results. Had the normal functioning of the body been upset by the unusual food? And if one found, after feeding some particular substance, that the animal's body contained a high concentration of some other compound, was this made out of the actual substance one had administered, or was it produced out of atoms which were already present? There was no way of being absolutely sure. But the radio-elements put all such questions on a much more secure foundation. Radio-active phosphorus is not a substance which an animal comes across in the ordinary course of its existence; and if some is found in a particular organ, after a dose of it has been administered to the animal, one can be quite certain that the radio-phosphorus detected was really the actual substance which had been given, and not something which had been present in the body beforehand.

The radio-elements can therefore be used as "tracers," as they are called, to follow out in detail the chemical changes which go on in living organisms. Their advantages are very numerous. Not only is one quite sure of what one is dealing with, as we have just seen, but once the substances have been manufactured, the technical methods are fairly easy. The rays given out by a radio-active substance affect photographic plates. One can measure the concentration of radio-substance in any part of the body by the darkness of the image it can produce by its own radiation, when it is laid on a photographic plate in the dark; or one can measure the radiation by simple electrical means.

The first results obtained with "radio-actice tracers" were nearly all confirmations of theories which biologists had already put forward on the basis of more elaborate experiments involving more doubtful chains of argument; and some sceptics thought that nothing of much importance was going to come out of the new method. But as time has

gone on, the "tracer" results, particularly in the hands of American workers, have become more and more exciting, and it now looks as though they are going to be responsible for a completely revolutionary change in our ideas of the kind of chemical processes which go on in living matter.

First of all, new light is being thrown on some of the basic chemical reactions on which life depends. Perhaps the most important reaction in the world is that by which plants, by the aid of their green colouring matter, chlorophyll, and of the energy which they receive from the sun's light, convert the carbon dioxide of the air into the starches and sugars, from which, at second or third hand, all other living things obtain their energy. Now biologists have long believed two dogmas about this reaction; firstly that it is only performed by organisms containing the pigment chlorophyll, and secondly that it can only occur if there is enough light to contribute the necessary energy. The tracer studies have shown that both of these theories are untrue. Plants containing chlorophyll can form starch out of carbon dioxide even in complete darkness, though they do it very slowly; and most living things can use carbon dioxide, in a small way, even if they do not contain any chlorophyll. Our whole ideas about what has been called the fundamental reaction of life have got to be revised; other tracer studies (using "heavy" oxygen and radio-carbon) are already beginning to give the outlines of a more correct picture.

Important though these advances are, they are not of a kind which will cause a radical alteration in our general picture of a living organism. But that is just what some of the tracer studies are producing. They are showing that many reactions which we had thought of as simple one-way processes are actually more complex two-way interchanges. To take a simple example. The small hairs on the roots of plants absorb nutrient salts from the moisture in the soil. Botanists had normally regarded this as a straight taking-in of substances by the root; but the tracers show that there is really a two-way traffic of salts, outwards as well as inwards, so that what we had previously observed is not the whole process, but only the excess of the inward over the outward stream.

Obviously this means that the chemical processes in living cells must be much more rapid and manifold than biologists had thought. And that seems to be very generally true. In particular, it turns out that a large number of compounds which had been looked on as relatively inert and stable are actually undergoing continual change, being constantly broken down and rebuilt out of different atoms. The American biochemist Schönheimer was first able to demonstrate this for the fats. As a tracer, he used an isotope of hydrogen which is not radio-active,

but which has a heavier nucleus than the normal kind; it is somewhat more difficult to detect, but the principle of its use is exactly the same as that of the radio-compounds. He found that his tracer hydrogen could quite soon be detected even in fats which appeared to be merely storage deposits, and had previously been thought quite inactive. He then went on to use a heavy isotope of nitrogen, technically even more difficult to handle, but making possible an attack on the proteins, which, as the Ministry of Food keeps reminding us, are the body-building substances. Body-building they may be, but they are not an inert skeleton like bricks or concrete. Tracer nitrogen is found to have been built into them within a few hours after being administered. In fact, in living things the flux of chemical breakdown and rebuilding is so all-pervading that even the protein framework is involved in it. It has for long been a platitude to compare a living system to a flame—a thing which retains its individuality in spite of a continual flow of material through it. But the analogy turns out to be much more exact than its users had thought. Scarcely any part of a living organism stays put—there are a few exceptions, as always in biological material—but life seems to imply incessant antagonistic activities of decay and renewal, and to be, in fact, merely the result of a lack of perfect balance between these two opposing processes.

THE PACIFIST SCHISM

By John Armitage

MORE than two and a half years of war have helped to clarify the position of the Christian pacifist. The emotional 'hang-over' experienced by many a young man reaching manhood in the unprincipled 'thirties showed signs of disappearing in May, 1940 and was finally blown away in June, 1941.* This much may be said for those who united under the banner of pacifism before the war: they sensed the lack of leadership, the drift to war and the poverty of statesmanship. They had been nourished, this generation of post-Versailles youth, on the milk of the League of Nations and they lived to see the milk turn sour as one after another the nations either left the League or shrank from courageous action as likely to lead to an evil result for their individual interests. The League foundered but the pacifist clung to his policy of peace. It was a policy without machinery; yet it was still a considerable thorn in the flesh of a Government possessing the machinery but no policy.

The decline in pacifism since the outbreak of war is irrefutable. The pacifist may argue that the fall in the percentage of conscientious objectors with each successive age-group registered is due to one cause: the idealism of youth giving way to the disillusion and cynicism of old age. That is partly true. Youth is ever eager to play the martyr while old age feels the pressure of its responsibilities. But it is by no means the whole story. The character of the war has changed, if not in fact at least in the eyes of men.

Only a very small part of pacifism has remained whole after two and a half years of war and that is the essence of Christian pacifism. Many of the young men who swelled the ranks of Christian pacifism did so less—although they did not know it—from the commands of their own conscience than from the reflections in the shallow waters of their minds of stern thoughts born not without travail in the minds of others. Such reflections did no one dishonour but the Christian pacifist is well rid of these supporters. Christianity begins in the mind, the conscious searching after truth, while conscience is the child of intellectual conviction. It cannot be the outcome of emotion.

The great trouble with pacifism before the war was that it abandoned its true rôle of the intellectual leaven in society by the attempt to supplant quality by quantity. It would be uncharitable and indeed untrue to

* One pacifist I knew renounced his pacifism in August, 1939, judging the Hitler-Stalin pact as the final blow to his cause. He joined the territorials. Another judged Hitler's attack on Stalin the final blow.

pretend that the leaders of the pacifist movement have not in the past ten years enriched Christian thought; in more than one instance they have been the spearhead of that thought. At the same time the fretful mouthings of some of their supporters have been hard to bear. One imagines that many a serious student has been turned aside from a proper consideration of Christian pacifism by the pacifist's meagre understanding of his own creed. It is even doubtful if it is possible for a very young man to be a Christian pacifist. He neither knows nor has experienced life enough. Yet it is to the young man that pacifism most appeals; to callow youth who still knows right from wrong. He is the crusader, the would-be martyr and, too, the sensitive and shy.

The Christian pacifist has been mistaken in allying himself with others who sharing his pacifist persuasion are unable to accept his reasons. Whatever the arguments that the non-Christian can summon in defence of his attitude it is little more than coincidence that he arrives at the same decision not to fight as his Christian neighbour. To make the decision the bond of union is false; it is the argument supporting the decision that is all important. Minority opinions often embrace strange partners but the Christian must account it odd if the circumstance of accidental agreement with the heathen on a single point means more to the Christian pacifist than all the treasures of a common heritage.

That for the non-Christian pacifist the house of pacifism had shallow foundations has now been proved. It is scarcely probable that they rested on any foundations whatsoever beyond an earnest and by no means despicable ideal that the world should not again be plunged into the horrors and miseries of war. Life is not so easy to arrange as that, as this war has shown. Never before have so many innocents, nations as well as individuals, suffered so vilely from the evil depredations of their stronger neighbours. Never before has it been so clearly shown that unprotected virtue arouses not chivalry but lust. And to be fair many erstwhile pacifists have recognized this; they have seen enough to make them think again.

But for the Christian pacifist the position remains fundamentally unchanged. His argument is based not on the effectiveness of non-resistance to stop aggression, at least not as a short-term policy, but on his right, or as he might express it, on his duty to withdraw from society at this point and to refrain from taking part in what every fibre of his being tells him to be wrong. He does so with his eyes open. He knows the consequences; the probable loss of his own skin and the skins of those he loves. Yet he hopes that in return he will save his soul and theirs. For him the decision means the Cross and he is prepared to hang there.

It is at this point that some Christian pacifists, doubting their own fortitude or questioning their own reactions at the moment of trial, waver. Can they be sure that they would face the Cross if it stood before them? Cranmer, Latimer and Ridley managed it well enough four hundred years ago and Latimer's words still stir one with the deepest possible admiration.* To face the Cross oneself may be a big decision but it is still easier than making pacifism a political issue and forcing others who have not accepted the arguments for it to abide by the results of the policy. The Cross has no meaning for the unbeliever.

A devout Christian pacifist, and a prophet not without honour for his work in his own borough, said recently with a sigh: if only we could bridge the gulf between the pacifist and non-pacifist Christian. He saw this gulf as a great division in the minds of Christian men, cleaving brother from brother and making all spiritual contact impossible. For this attitude he was not alone responsible. The unwelcome publicity given at one time to the less meritorious appeals at tribunals and the fierce glare of newspaper spotlight on the activities of certain public figures made pacifism synonymous with disloyalty, a charge which all Christians must face if loyalty means putting King before God. No one has yet stated that this is so although the man who squares his shoulders for God Save the King in church and shuffles through the Creed gets near to expressing it. The Christian pacifist is not disloyal, nor does he necessarily lack physical courage. Indeed during the period when he was being most criticized pacifist units were gaining honours for personal bravery in the most heavily 'blitzed' areas of London and elsewhere. At the time of the worst raids I had supper before the sirens sounded with one unit in their eyrie at the top of a tenement block in Stepney. What they most lacked was a sense of domestic propriety (the butter was under a tin hat); not physical courage.

Yet as a result of passionate feelings aroused by the condition of war a pacifist schism has been allowed to take place. Moreover the schism is fostered among the pacifists themselves by their sense of isolation and by the main body of Christians who affect to ignore their brethren or who notice them only to upbraid in this hour of trial. No schism can be good. At its worst it puts the schismatics into a hopelessly false position and at its best the schismatics are guilty of making a part more important than the whole

What is peculiar to the present situation is that the gulf visualized by the devout Christian pacifist already referred to is entirely imaginary. The point at which men say they will not fight does roughly divide those who are called pacifists from those who find war compatible with their

* "Play the man, Master Ridley; and we shall this day light such a candle by God's grace in England as I trust shall never be put out."

Christian conscience. But among the ranks of pacifists there are men of every gradation of opinion just as there are among the men who find themselves in or support the armed forces. Between these who prefer prison to any form of national service which may help the war effort and those who think that the only good German is a dead one (are there still Christians who think this?) there is indeed a great gulf fixed. But the bridge is already across the gulf. They are linked by their Christian brothers who in a steady progression from prison to downright militarism make a chain of thought via agriculturists, non-combatants, reluctant and enthusiastic militarists.

Most Christians come in the reluctant class. That is they see the war as the result not the cause of evil although recognizing that war does undoubtedly bring fresh causes of evil in its train. The fact that Christians as a whole have accepted the war in a contrite spirit is all to the good. It is difficult for anyone who has studied the Gospels to imagine Jesus taking a pleasure in war even if one can see him punishing with righteous anger. All know that in war the innocent suffer at least equally with the guilty but most feel that however they apportion blame there is little to be gained by systematic presentation of the other cheek. That is reducing the argument to a dangerously low level and it would be better perhaps to eschew the temptation to elucidate why the meaning of the Cross is interpreted in so many different ways.

What should emerge quite clearly is that no Christian can expect or should desire to judge for another. There is no universal rule for determining right or wrong. But the individual Christian has it in his power to determine what is right or wrong for him. This is a matter which lies solely between him and God. He must wrestle with his problem as Jesus wrestled in the Garden of Gethsemane before choosing the Cross. And he must pray using the same words: nevertheless not my will, but thine, be done. All through this life the Christian is living part of the time in the Garden of Gethsemane, continually struggling to get a little nearer to the truth. It is unlikely that the man who reaches old age with the same religious views as he held in childhood has made much effort to learn God's will and it is not surprising that it is just this man who will condemn so easily the opinions of others.

The story of pacifism is similar to much else of Christian experience. It is largely a matter of compromise. How, when and where does one determine to say to the world or society: thus far and no farther? To most Christians it seems illogical that a man who has played his part in society in time of peace, objecting no doubt to this and that but nevertheless conforming in the main, should, at the outbreak of war, refuse to fight. Years ago, they say, the dragon's teeth were sown and now we reap. But man is illogical not least of all

in his conduct of war. Ferocity is tempered by mercy, except apparently in a merciless section of the German people, and hate by a kindness which in individual cases comes near to love.

There are some who take delight in pointing out the illogicality of the pacifist's actions. The fact is that no man can think for another and what appears illogical in action is not necessarily illogical in conscience. Possibly the Christian pacifist, who for one reason or another has failed to get total exemption at his tribunal and elects instead of service to go to prison as regularly as the law requires, demonstrates the nearest approach to logicality that can be achieved. But even he finds that he does not satisfy his conscience in all respects.

Illogicality is the rock on which the tribunals founder. There is something very comforting in our system of tribunals for conscientious objectors and providing fair-minded men are selected to sit on them there seems at first sight no reason why they should not produce a very good result. But apart from an ability to detect humbug, which able and experienced men may be expected to do, it is to be doubted if any group of men can be relied upon to gauge the relative qualities of conscience in terms of total exemption, agriculture or non-combatant service. The argument which sounds poor in the ears of the men constituting the tribunal may well be so according to the logic of the hearers but it is not the objector's logic which is being measured but his conscience and for this quality there is no common denominator.

If this is so it is plain that the Christian must not fall into the trap of judging the conscience of others by the yardstick of his own. If there is any meaning at all in the idea of the Universal Church it is obvious that Christians must begin by accepting the fact that there is a divergence of opinion on many matters of most vital importance. All Christians are agreed that war is bad and that somehow or other we must find a way of overcoming it. But from that moment there is a great parting of the ways. Christian pacifists supported the League of Nations and disarmament as complementary elements of the same idea. Christian militarists supported the League of Nations and felt that it failed because it refused to face up to the necessity of backing its decisions by force. Christian pacifists said that if you prepared for war you got war; Christian militarists said that if you disarmed you became the victim of non-Christian society. For myself I believe that the world will not live in peace until the people in it have accepted Christian principles for themselves; I do not believe that God's laws can be imposed by combinations of peoples and nations with different codes of honour and ideas. For Christians the first step is surely to unite as Christians and to achieve this they must abhor the very thought of schism like the plague.

AN AIRMAN SPEAKS

By Joseph Braddock

TO climb the dark, dare all, there's something here
Beyond the slow security of peace,
Children, the city train, the week-end garden.
This balanced machine protects the well-loved earth,
Fields falling away in dusk; dissolving towns;
Watching England asleep like any mother.
To win safety for those we love, bred from our soil,
Flesh of our flesh, bone of our bone, the ideal
We aim at, part achieve when we stake lives
Roaring our rhetoric across the sky,
Flashing, knight-errants, over lands beleaguered,
Freedom's men, with Zeus' thunderbolts, avenging flame.

"Know thyself," so said Thales. Cut the classics.
How do you really feel? A lonely man
Within a mechanistic marvel sent
Upon a doubtful mission. O death-bird
Swifter than swift, like sphinx-moth wonderful,
Fantastic plane among the hordes of killers,
Death-dealing robots, why should you take me thus
To hurl destruction upon many people
Victims of evil, inherited bad blood?
No more. Not that way. Do not think like that,—
Of monstrous pyrotechnics, spouting fire,
Flash, crash and smoke and shudder, rocking plane
Above a total combat as when Gods
Fell upon Titans, but in that hell below
Knowing the shrieking child, the innocent girl,
The boy she now won't marry, old people
Dragged from the stinking rubble before their time.
What joke is this? What devilry the bomb-racks?
There was a face beside a lake at Fürberg,
A body perfect beyond the greatest sculpture
Symmetry ripening for *my* mutilation,
Live springing hair that grows on in the grave;

Two brothers who with straight eyes laughed in Munich,
Child-bloom complexions, perhaps to-night they're bloody,
Burned, twisted, mangled. Ah! Obscene, obscene.

There England ends, begins the shining water,
The Channel, pathway for small beetle convoys
Indomitably succouring this so hard-pressed fortress,
Blackly proceeding over moonlit water,
Daring red belches from a hostile coast.
(There's no way out. We chose the lesser evil
Shunned over long, reluctant, forced upon us).
Humanity in prison waves us welcome
As, liberators on the daylight aether,
We ride and soar and swoop to man's assistance,
Aiming our blows at the Cruel Heart, the crouching
Widow-spider lurking, foul, in Central Europe.

Now in my veins flows an upwelling glory
Glows in my veins fresh ichor, ecstasy
To cut the knot of bestial tyranny
And liberate, liberate all the martyred nations,
Even Germany.
There is something here
Beyond those flannelled, cynic hours of peace.
When peace meant nothing but a mean betrayal,
Comfort, vicarious thrills and faked adventure,
Money-making, flat celluloid romance.

Suspend my ship between the earth and stars,
Support me, plane between the moon and God,
And aid me as I thunder with my squadron,
Good midwives all, to bring to birth a World!
When terrible parturition is accomplished
And agony's only a spent out fever,
May someone look upon an infant Europe
And read the dawning promise in his eyes.

The Channel flashes faint and the wind's cold
Upon my face, and there is Cassiopeia
Stretching among the legions of the stars.
My peers are now white Jupiter, red Mars,
My invitation's to a dance of death.

POINTS OF VIEW

II. The Farm Labourer

By Fred Kitchen

MAN was given a pair of hands, and for generations his pride and glory were in his handiwork. The result was, the earth was enriched and beautified by the work of his hands—and his handiwork endured for generations. Not only works of art, beautiful statues and noble buildings, but in an humbler way the tiller of the soil acquired great skill in handiwork, so that even husbandry became (though unrecognized) a fine art. He ploughed, sowed, reaped, stacked and thatched, with a skill, and an eye to artistry, worthy of a nation's applause. He got none, for the simple reason, his artistry was but for a season, to be pulled down and started anew each year. But that he took pride in his handiwork there can be no doubt—as did every craftsman who lived by his hands. Then man invented a machine. It was intended to give rest to his hands, and to increase the comfort and wealth of the community, but so engrossed was he in creating more and more machines, that he lost the use of his hands, and craftsmanship became a lost art. The machine became so all important, that it ruled supreme until it made and finally destroyed the man who made it.

And in the midst of this great holocaust man cries out, "Wherewith shall we be fed?" Our grandfather's methods would not do, for they lacked machinery. Their simple method was to fatten their cattle when nature opened her larder in spring and summer, then when autumn came to kill their fat stock and salt enough of it down to last through the winter, keeping only stores and milk-cows during the winter. The same applied to some extent with the milk-cows. Nature, of course, decrees that animals shall produce their young in the spring of the year, but of recent years, the gestation period of the dairy-herd has been completely reversed. It was much better so, providing enough foreign feeding stuff could be procured for winter feeding; and the dairy cow—being an obliging sort of animal in these matters—was connived with to calve between October and about Christmas time. This resulted in an increase of milk at the time of year when milk would be normally scarce, and was an advantage to the producer and consumer alike. Now, of course, the war machine has cut off foreign cattle food, so the question is: "How

to produce milk in winter?" and the obvious answer is: "Produce it in summer! turn the herd round again to calf in spring, and make all the milk you can—and can the surplus—while the grass is good and plentiful." But it would take time to divert a herd back again to spring-calving—and, bless your life, it wouldn't require machinery. So machinery is set up whereby the cattle are deprived of eating too much spring grass, which is mown green and stored away in silos for winter use. To encourage the use of silage it has been proved that this stinking rotten mixture is rich in protein, and though we believe it is so, the cattle seem to have doubts about it, and instead of relishing it, as they would fresh green grass, eat it sparingly, and refuse to get fat.

Against the question of whether we should produce our beef and milk in summer, comes the question of farm-yard manure. Unless we have a considerable number of cattle housed in the winter, there will be a shortage of manure, and consequently a loss of fertility in the arable lands. On the other hand there will be more food and straw for the store cattle—which will eventually be converted into manure—so with no extra cake available, there doesn't seem much point in keeping animals in winter, which can be fed more cheaply in summer, and the beef salted—or frozen—for winter use, and the surplus milk dried or tinned. And what about this drive and urge to drink more milk? Undoubtedly it is the natural, and therefore the best food for growing children, but surely the Almighty didn't give us wisdom teeth to chew milk. For all the boosting of milk as a national beverage, lots of thirsty souls still find "body in John Barleycorn" to supply a refreshing drink.

Where do we stand now? and how can we make the best of this "blessed plot of earth—this England?"

There was a time when the farmer had only Providence to rely upon, and if "whoats were fetching nowt," "wheat were a fair price," and he thanked Providence, that "things were no wosser than they were." Then machinery was set up to create a new kind of Providence in a Minister of Agriculture, and then the farmers grumbled—as they always do—because they found the new Providence not quite up to the standard of the old Providence, and after an average of two new Providences a year, they found out farming could not be done from Whitehall.

And the war came; and this happened. A shortage of skilled labour on the farms, and politicians and everyone wondering what had become of 'em, when all the time they had helped to drive them away by advocating more machinery. Now they are trying to call them back again, and, baiting them with a modicum of cheese, have, after much hesitation, awarded them a princely minimum of £3 per week (there are boys, unskilled, on munitions getting twice as much).

But the farm-worker will not grumble, providing he can pay his way,

and he can be depended on to do his best toward filling the nation's larder. Most farmers agree that a £3 minimum is no more than just to the man on whom he depends for the success of his crops, for no class of employer is so much in the hands of his men as is the farmer. But there's no denying it, there are others to whom the paying out of a few extra shillings is more nerve wracking than an all-night blitz, and from these come pitiful wails about charging rent for the service cottage. Many M.P.'s, and other people who potter about after our social welfare, condemn the system of the "tied" or "service" cottage. The system is sound, and beneficial to both master and man. It is the cottage and not the system that should be condemned, for while on the big estates the cottages are generally good, in some districts, the tenants ought to be paid a rent for their courage in occupying them, rather than having to pay rent for living in such rat-holes.

A £3 minimum for the war period is not sufficient, if the skilled worker is to be kept on the land. His position should be made more secure, for after the war his wage will be the first to suffer a reduction, for the cry again will be for cheap food, and once again the farm-worker will be left aside—to be called for. The land-worker, therefore, should be given a proprietary interest in the land; if this were done, better use of the land would be the result, and the skilled worker would not be missing in the country's hour of need should that occasion again arise. To achieve this, every skilled farm-worker should be given the opportunity of farming on his own account. Cobbett said, "A man will love his country all the better for a pig," and it's true to say, he would love it still more if he had a plot of earth to go along with it. But not on the already dying system of landlord and tenant, for a small-holder's life under these conditions would be one of intense drudgery, where he and his family would have to pinch and scrape from daylight to dark to eke out a living. But the present large landowner system is wearing away, and in justice to the farm-worker, and as an insurance against national hunger, and to prevent the loss of skilled men on the land, whenever a large estate is broken up the State should become the owner and plant it out with that most profitable product of the countryside—the skilled farm-worker. They should be given fifty-acre holdings under Government grants, and set up on a co-operative basis, so getting back their former status and independence, which the Enclosure Acts of one hundred years ago, robbed away from their forefathers. And why not? Though leaders of every political party advocate larger farms and more machinery, it must be borne in mind the Government is paying out millions of pounds each year to keep them afloat, without much hope of return. Whereas, if the State were the landlord, the money would be an investment, not a subsidy: the land would produce more per acre by

individual attention, and the skilled worker would remain on the land.

It will be pointed out—with a mass of figures to prove it—that a large farm can be worked more economically than a small one. But figures prove nothing, they are movable digits, while the land—especially those fields lying a long way off the muck-yard—stays put. Agriculture is a process, not a manufacturing concern, and cannot be run on factory lines. To run a big farm on factory lines, those far off fields would have to be brought home and placed four or five storeys high, which—thank goodness—no machinery invented has yet been able to bring about. So the far off fields remain a mile or so away from home—and the manure heap, and receive less attention than the fields nearer home. This would be remedied if the outlying fields were made into holdings for approved farm-workers and could be done at no more expense than is now paid on subsidies.

Farming is a slow process, and to get a paying crop out of neglected land a farmer may have to wait several years before he sees any return for the capital laid out in reclaiming impoverished soil. Therefore he must have security of tenure—and isn't it worth while to make the skilled worker equally secure? After all the soil is the common heritage of the farm-worker as well as of the farmer. Nay, often his roots lie deeper in the soil than do his master's, for, during the last Great War, as in this, speculative farmers bought farms, whose only idea of the soil was a commodity out of which to procure more money. On the other hand, the farm-man looks on the soil with reverence and understanding, having no other motive than to encourage the fruit of the earth. No one grieves more at the breaking up of noble estates than do the tenant labourers, and to preserve these beautiful bits of old England from the speculator and jerry-builder, they should become State property on which to settle skilled workers—not as a concession, but as a national trust, so that never again need our land become derelict, or be unprepared to meet a national shortage of food.

One way to keep the young farm-worker from drifting into town, would be a more comprehensive use of Agricultural Colleges. At present, farm institutes and colleges are largely monopolized by the sons of farmers, and such as have enough capital to provide their sons with the education in agricultural science and up-to-date practices given by these institutions. The son of a farm-worker has little chance to avail himself of these opportunities—scholarships to agricultural colleges are very few—one reason being, of course, lack of interest on the part of the young farm-worker.

When land is laid down to grass, as during the past twenty years, it offers no inducement for the young to become interested in agriculture. The skilled stacker and ploughman is not needed, so the youth has none

of the motives that caused his father to cling to the soil in spite of lean times and adversities.

With all the rapid progress made in agricultural science, the "four-course-system" laid down by Lord Townshend in the 18th century still remains the soundest contribution to keeping the soil "fit" and in good heart, and with temporary leys instead of permanent pasture, the soil never becomes sick of either corn or cattle.

It also means more men will be needed on the land, and to keep them there, and to give the young farm-worker an incentive to take up agricultural education, his parents should become state-tenants and not mere landless labourers.

Likewise agricultural education should embrace all village industries—agricultural mechanics, the wheelwright, and wood-craft. The great danger of large farm units is to draw the rural population under the depressing influence of mass-production. In country towns and large villages where the facilities of adult education are plentiful you can see the effect of mass-mindedness—a dog race has more attraction than the pleasure of art, music or science—and the same thing would happen to the farm-worker herded on factory farms. To build a happy England would be more worthy than to patch up a "Merry England."

Regarding child labour as a help in the war-effort! The average schoolboy, picking potatoes, rips in as though he never meant to leave off work again. This spate lasts for about an hour, after which he has no further interest in potatoes. His knowledge of aeroplanes is remarkable, and every 'plane that comes over he recognizes at once, Lysander, Beaufort, Wellington, twin-engine, four-engine, what crew they carry, what speed they attain—he knows all. But of devotion to duty—especially to potatoes—he has learned nothing. Wherever a group of school-children are employed on field work, they should be under the supervision of a school-teacher. On no account should they be placed in a mixed company of casual land-workers. No one would say that the conversation was not "educational"; but it is scarcely the kind of education to promote good citizenship.

But just now, the question is, how to make the most of the land available? To look at the British Isles on a map, there doesn't seem much land to do anything with, while towns, railways and roads appear so closely together, that to adopt "prairie" methods seem impracticable. No doubt it would be beneficial to stub up many of our hedges, for, whoever planted them seemed to have lost all sense of direction, and a hedgerow full of bends and twists causes a lot of unnecessary labour in cultivating the field, besides taking up space that might be growing more food. Even with the shortage of labour, it would pay to have them removed, a job which could very well be done in frosty weather

when land-work was slack. But not all of them! No one would wish to make "a scorched earth" of English hedgerows and spoil an æsthetic taste, for the mundane, though pressing, taste of our stomachs. Of course farming would be carried on more economically without the interruption of hedgerows, but then, Economics is only an over-worked theory dating no further back than Adam Smith, whereas the cultivation and enrichment of the earth goes back to a much earlier Adam.

And that dreadful word Economics leads us to the question of "speeding up Agriculture." It just can't be done! unless someone invents a process of speeding up the seasons—and let us be thankful that so far no one has proved brainy enough to alter the clock of nature. All we can do is to bend our energies on producing the most from our limited acreage. In this present case of national urgency the question of money and economies does not matter, the one thing needful is to grow more food per acre, and without a doubt the small units centred around the manure heap will produce more than the extensive acres lying a long way off the farmstead. A case in point is Mr. Tom Wibberly who successfully provides enough food, meat, milk and cereals, to satisfy four persons per year off only one acre of ground. Of course such intensive cultivation could not be carried out on general farm lands, but it does show that individual units of land can receive better attention than a wide expanse of acres depending on one centre.

But really, it's beyond the cope of a mere farm-hand to sum up the situation on the farm-front. He can only do his best at his own particular job, and wonder why he does some of it. For instance, farmers are given a bonus of £10 per acre for growing more potatoes than the nation can possibly eat, and the ploughman wonders why and is told: "The surplus is made into potato flour." It seems a waste of effort when many times that quantity of flour could be made on the same acreage of wheat.

Another question that puzzles the farm-worker is: "Does farming pay?" He never hears a farmer boasting of having made a fortune out of the soil, and in his own summing up of agriculture, since the last Great War, it has been one of the best money-losing businesses in England. But—and here comes his greatest puzzle—every month in the land-workers' own special magazine there appears a list of farmers' wills proved. They number about a score each month, and the sums involved range anywhere from ten thousand to one hundred thousand pounds. It seems queer for a decaying industry, and leaves one with the impression that, though the farmer lives all his life "on the rocks," he manages somehow to die "in clover."

CORRESPONDENCE

SIR BERNARD PARES AND POLAND

To the Editor of THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

May I correct some statements contained in the article of Sir Bernard Pares *Britain and Russia* (March number of THE FORTNIGHTLY) which I consider mistaken?

Sir Bernard states that Poland robbed Russia of a big territory inhabited by 14 millions of Russians. "This territory was recovered by the Soviet government when the Polish army was defeated by Hitler and otherwise it could only pass to him . . . . fortunately it is a precedent for the British view on the question of the frontier line recommended to both parties by Lord Curzon in 1920." In one of his former articles (in the *Manchester Guardian*) Sir Bernard estimated the number of Russians subjugated by the Poles at 10 millions "only." It is true that the increase in the Soviet population has been very great; but nevertheless it seems highly improbable that since Sir Bernard's former article was published, the increase should have reached 40 per cent. over the figure given in it. The truth is that the territory occupied by the Russians in September, 1939, during Poland's fight against Hitler had a total population of 12 millions. Among them there were 120,000 Russians, that is, 1 per cent. Besides there were: 4,800,000 Poles, 4,125,000 Ukrainians, 1,700,000 White-Russians and 1,050,000 Jews. (It should not be misunderstood—the White-Russians are as different from the Russians or Ukrainians, as the Spanish are from the French). The north of that territory has been purely Polish and so it has been since the 10th century. The southern parts, with a rather mixed population, belonged to the Polish state for at least 400 years; some of those provinces never were under Russian rule, not even for the shortest spell; others, and the smallest parts were dominated by Russia only since the partition of Poland. The treaties of this partition of Poland occurred in 1772, 1793 and 1795, and were officially declared void and null by the Soviet Government on April 9, 1918, and that decision of the Soviet Government was notified to the German Government on October 3, 1918.

The Polish Soviet frontier as settled by the Riga treaty was a compromise between both states and not in the least was it based upon any Polish intention to exploit Poland's military victory to the detriment

of Russia. Poland gave up about 120,000 square miles of the territory which she could claim for herself on the ground of the Soviet declaration of April 9, 1918. As to the Curzon line it is worth mentioning that both Poland and the Soviets rejected the frontier suggested by that proposal, a fact Sir Bernard seems to forget. The negative attitude of the Soviets towards the Curzon line was several times officially stated in Soviet diplomatic documents addressed to the British Government. Incidentally, the Curzon line originally presented no special British point of view; it merely reiterated the proposal of the Supreme Allied Council of December 8, 1919, which had drawn only a temporary demarcation line between the fighting armies, without pretending to fix any boundary. It should be added that the Supreme Allied Council when submitting this proposal explicitly recognized Poland's right to further claims for territories situated to the East of this temporary demarcation line.

Whilst I fully share Sir Bernard's good intentions towards Soviet Russia, I am anable to see why these should be substantiated by inaccurate statistical and historical data.

Yours faithfully,

JAN SZELIGA.

55, Exhibition Road,
S.W.7.

Sir Bernard Pares writes:

I cannot accept the Polish statistics put forward in the controversy over the debated territory. I am aware that the facts are much disputed. With regard to the suggested inconsistency in my own statement on the subject, it is difficult for me check this, as Mr. Szeliga does not give the reference, but of one thing I feel quite certain—that I never used the word 'only' (ten million) which he attributes to me in quotation marks. It is quite clear that the Ukrainians and the White Russians, among both of whom I have lived, are variants of the Russian nationality and not of the Polish: nor has Polish policy ever given the slightest encouragement to their independence. The Polish frontier of 1939 cut White Russia exactly in half. The vast majority of the Christians lay in Russia, and to absorb them the Poles would have to march nearly to the Volga.

But surely the point of the whole matter is that this is a question which the Poles will have to settle with the Russians of themselves. My citation of the Curzon line (I do not accept Mr. Szeliga's qualifications of the details) is to show that the British government did actually express an opinion on the subject, and that for our part we cannot be asked to go beyond it. The Curzon line is reasonably close to the Russian

frontier of 1941, in which, like Mr. Szeliga, I should like to see some modifications. But unless we are to fight Russia for what lies further East, I cannot see what the Poles expect us to do to advance their claim.

From 1907 to 1917, when Poland was off the map, I worked hard for the Polish cause in close co-operation with the Polish leader, Mr. Romen Dmowski, and I have established the first posts for the study of Poland in two British universities. In 1917 those Russian statesmen with whom I had been in the closest touch, as almost the first act of the Provisional Government of that year, conceded full independence to the Poles. I am quite convinced that it is exactly the interest of the Soviet Government that there shall be an independent Poland and an independent Czechoslovakia, relying on Russian support against German aggression. But I cannot agree that we are concerned in fighting out the Polish claims with Russia, or that they would be in the interest of the Poles themselves.

RECONSTRUCTION AND THE LAND

To the Editor of The Fortnightly.

Sir,

May I be allowed to put in a demurrer to your reviewer's misinterpretation of a passage from my *Reconstruction and the Land* which he quotes in his closing sentences (March number).

Surely the context of the passage makes it plain enough that in describing the eighteen-sixties as the 'Golden Age' of British Farming, with wheat above 50s. a quarter and wages at 12s. a week, I was reporting the farmer's point of view of the past now remembered by few.

The passage cannot be construed as bearing on the 'national interest'; it is a simple factual statement that farmers were making money in those years and looked back to them with regret.

The whole purpose of the rest of my book is to show that the national interest in agriculture is not to be measured by the current prosperity of farmers only, but by the extent to which the land can be made to subserve the needs of the population in general.

A. DANIEL HALL.

Long Sutton House,
Basingstoke.

Mr. John Stewart Collis writes: I got the impression—though no doubt wrongly—that Sir Daniel Hall seemed to share the pleasure which those farmers felt for that 'Golden Age.'

EBB AND FLOW—A BOOK COMMENTARY

By Stephen Gwynn

A Crowded Year

WHEN this war began, Mr. Anthony Weymouth had the idea of keepi a diary which would not only recall his day to day experience l also put on record what he learnt through official contacts w significant persons whom he met in his work as organizer of Ta for the B.B.C. His first volume, *A Psychologist's Wartime Diary*, was pu lished by Harrap in 1940; the second, *Plague Year*, is n before us, and for half a guinea one can revive the emoti of a crowded twelve months down to February of last ye Memories have been so battered with stimuli that they can hardly funct so completely as usual, and it is not only in future periods, less familiar w the sound of bombs, that this review of happenings will be welcomed. the impression which he produces on my mind is that of a man half daz and indeed it would have been untrue to the temper of the time portraye his diary set out a clear story of those weeks in which France and the L Countries were overrun, or of the others in which London was bombar night after night. It is surprising that Dunkirk appears only as a glori name; I thought we had all visualized that tragic deliverance. Yet after most of what he has to tell us is less about public events than individ encounters—mostly with civilians such as his friend the foreman bri layer who objected to having men called off their work during raids. "I 'em be; then if they machine-gun us, only two will likely ' shot. But they crowd us together, they may get as many as forty." Sense as well valour spoke there; the work would go on, for its own sake, and for a gest of defiance.

Again, it is interesting to know that after France surrendered, G.B.S. wr a Talk which contained this sentence. "The future of the world may well in the hands of the U.S.A. and Russia—that's why I'm always so civil Russia"—Russia being then in alliance with Germany. Unluckily the T was held up because Mr. Shaw had remarked that Hitler was no less sure th Lord Halifax of having God on his side. "If so," said the script, "we sh have to fight God as well as Mr. Hitler." But G.B.S. went on to express reasonable belief that "God would see fair." However the situation alte so fast that the talk regrettably had to be scrapped. I agree with Mr. W mouth that it would have been of value to the Allied Cause that Mr. Sh should "tell the world that we must fight." Nobody has ever doubted pugnacity—but it was not often in line with the British Government's wish Yet whatever the British Government may do at any moment, the Brit people always like and listen to this Irishman—who, according to Mr. W mouth, was quite ready to see Ireland invaded if necessary by British troo whatever Mr. de Valera might say. Mr. de Valera brought civil war i Ireland in the name of nationalism: Mr. Shaw, another Nationalist, wo have done as much for an international purpose.

The British Army

All sorts of topics, personal and impersonal, civil and military, come naturally into Mr. Weymouth's record; and perhaps there is more to be learned from another book of more limited scope which I have read with unexpected enjoyment; for Mr. Michael Joseph was known to me by name only as one of the more recently established publishers, and did not seem a likely man to give account of the charm which the British army ever exercises over those whose association with it has been temporary and accidental. Yet he has done this. *The Sword in the Scabbard* (which his firm publishes at 10s. 6d.) opens by saying that even before the war began there was a rush of ex-officers wanting to get back. "To say that they volunteered is an under-statement; they seemed to spend most of their time trying, at first without success, to rejoin." Even he with four years service and a special knowledge of machine guns to his credit, and only forty-one scored up against his age record, did not easily get in. Yet, he says, though I do not think he proves it, that the army is right in giving great preference to younger men. The colonel under whom I served most of my time was well on in the fifties, but most of us counted him the best commanding officer in the division, and the men at whose head he fell did full credit that day to his training. What is more, Mr. Joseph's own account makes it plain that he himself was a useful addition to the hasty levies that were forming after Dunkirk—under conditions of which till I read him, I had no conception.

However, this is not the book's main interest: I find that in the description of a literary man's experience with the professional British army. That battalion of the West Kent's was commanded by a thoroughly typical British officer, zealous for all the rigours of discipline; but behind the martinet was a human being of cultivation and charm. Mr. Joseph makes us all feel, what some of us experienced, that the British army is a grand field for friendships—and singularly welcoming for those who come into it from outside its peculiar pale. The messes of to-day have an element that we did not know a generation ago—men not professional soldiers, yet veterans, they like Mr. Joseph himself may bring a critical influence to bear on the army's methods—which, as he sees, imply abundance of time. You can turn out fighters quicker than soldiers, is how this book put it. Simply teach them the use of their weapons, and encourage the offensive spirit. Australian troops were quickly produced, and there is really no reason to believe that people of these islands are not just as good fighting material. The truth is that the British army was formed deliberately for a special purpose—to prevent wars. That is not what Hitler had in mind—or Napoleon. British training dispensed with all notion of personal dislike for the enemy; it made an army ready to fight without malice against those it was ordered to subdue. But under the modern conditions which Germany has so lavishly provided, men come into the army wanting to kill Germans (and now Japanese also) and this is an aid to producing fighters on which the army has never been accustomed to count. Mr. Joseph holds that, given this aid, much more expeditious methods of training could be devised. For one thing, he wants to bring propaganda into the barrack room; and he may be right. But on one point I call him misleading; this machine gunner condemns the bayonet. "Bows and arrows were useful weapons once," he says. That has nothing to do with it. Missiles belong to a different order of ideas, but so long as fighting exists, there will be the chance of the ultimate rough and tumble, in which the bayonet is supreme; and men can be given confidence in this weapon—though not I think by the

ordinary bayonet drill. There is no better physical exercise than fencin with spring bayonets, and it is much too often neglected.

* * * * *

The Voice of France

One thing is clear; the army that Mr. Joseph describes was a happy army the people among whom Mr. Weymouth recorded his experiences were people morally sound. Alas and alas! Mr. Thom Kernan's *Report on France* (Lane, 10s. 6d.) has a ver different theme. As director of the Paris edition of *Vogu* this American had lived long in Paris before the war, and while his countr was still neutral, he remained in charge of his paper and its offices, and h full opportunity to appreciate the elaborately thought out methods by whi Germany took control of all French business life. No doubt equally wel digested schemes for dealing with the British currency, the banks, the Sto Exchange and so forth are ready for application if occasion should aris and this part of Mr. Kernan's book is most instructive—and terrifying. Wh the Germans did at least stands to their credit for efficiency; what the Fren did, and did not do, makes the most painful of reading. I do not wish discuss his analysis of the reasons why in certain cases officers deserted th men, doctors and nurses their patients. Admitting that these cases we exceptional, if they happened even in one out of a hundred instances, t falling away from 1914-18 was appalling. It recalls to me that three or fo years after the armistice, I talked with a young Frenchman, half Irish a very modern. France, he said, was *un pays pourri.* "What about the war? said I. The war he said was only a *sursaut*—a spasm. "A *sursaut* that last four years," I retorted—and thought I had the best of it. But now, what one to think? Yet suppose in the days of Dunkirk, England had not fou Mr. Churchill. Clemenceau saved the situation in the last war. Was it on a chance that France could not find a man to galvan her superb qualiti in 1941? The choice of Pétain was disastrous; he was the man again whom no one had anything to say. Plenty of men had had plenty to s against Clemenceau and Lloyd George and our present Prime Minist their qualities were not negative. Mr. Kernan in the later chapters of l book lets us know how much might be said with justice against the gene conduct of France's leading men. In so far as this is a raking up of goss it seems highly undesirable; M. Reynaud in particular whom I have hea discourse impressed me not only as an able and honest man but as conspic ously a gentleman; I do not like to hear a gentleman's love affairs discuss in the tone which this editor of an American fashion paper thinks appropria He knows France in a certain way intimately; I do not feel that he kno those qualities in France which make the help of France indispensable in a reconstruction of Europe's civilization. Whether the voice of France be t voice of a republic or of a monarchy, it will be the voice of a free civilizati which will command understanding and response through all Europe such no Anglo-Saxon utterance can ever hope to secure.

* * * * *

The Poet and Life

Two books of real interest for students of poetry have proved less enj able than I hoped. One is the reprint in Everyman's Library of Alexan Gilchrist's *Life of William Blake*—edited by Ruthven To and published by Dent at 3s. The other is Mr. Steph Spender's *Life and the Poet*, published by Secker in t Searchlight library at 2s. Mr. Spender, writing with a great assumption

authority, says that the business of a poet is to be perpetuallly "asking questions about life and death and the universe." Blake was even too persistent in such questioning. Yet nobody could be more truly a poet than this artist craftsman who before he was fourteen had written one of the loveliest things in the Golden Treasury. But the trouble with Blake is that he went mad, and the company of even a gifted madman is wearisome. Wordsworth said that there was something in Blake's madness that interested him more than "the sanity of Lord Byron or Walter Scott"; yet I had sooner read a life of either Byron or Scott by almost any author than Gilchrist's over-detailed account of Blake's odd existence. Still in all the history of poetry there are few things more moving than the way in which Blake managed to bring out his first poems, engraving them letter by letter and selling the prints.

But let us consider Mr. Spender, who complains that a world full of "impersonal machine gods and the too successful class devoted to them" is unpropitious for poetry. One might remind him that Shakespeare was also discontented with his period. But I cannot help thinking that Shakespeare or Homer, if we could get hold of them, would tell Mr. Spender to look about him and be thankful for profusion of inspiring materials. There has no doubt been a deal of profiteering; but at present the rich are being flayed to the bone, and are not complaining; the world is full of men clamouring for the chance to put themselves in positions of the utmost hardship and danger. Surely Mr. Spender must see all about him personages on the grand scale for good or for bad, for splendour and for meanness. Quisling might have come out of the *Iliad*, so might Chiang Kai Shek. Or again, in this so-called mechanical age, look at the part played by Gandhi. It is only fair to say that Mr. Spender does not encourage the young left-wingers to repudiate war as a subject for poetry; he handsomely admits that it may convey moving and valuable experience—whatever their imbecile preciosity may think. But I cannot sympathize with his plea that government, when it gets poets into the armed forces, should provide them with time and seclusion for writing. Verse can be composed without chair and table; a deal of it probably was turned out in trenches; that is where poetry has the pull over prose. What Mr. Spender does not fully accept is that poetry is written very much for the fun of the thing, to get pleasure and to give pleasure; it does not affect the sacerdotal. A poet does not consciously, like a lecturer, address himself to other people; he is, and has got to be, his own audience; he sings first to himself, and he should never forget the part of Everyman that is in every poet. It is as his own audience that he insists on melody, accepts the joy of beautiful words; but also, as his own audience, he ought to look after Everyman's interest and see that the utterance can be understood. To judge by some of the verse that Mr. Spender quotes with approval (for instance from Mr. Dylan Thomas) he disregards this part of a poet's function—and to that extent denies to Everyman the appropriate pleasures of poetry. He says some fine things and acute things—as for instance that an old truth uttered by a new poet is not merely repeated; it has been lived again in different surroundings and is therefore reborn. But on the whole I should fear that he discouraged rather than promoted both the making and the reading of poetry, which he seems to present as rather a joyless job. But, thank God, the old springs of delight are always open—and may always be multiplied.

BRITISH LABOUR'S RISE TO POWER, by Carl F. Brand. *Oxford University Press* for Stamford University, California. 21*s.* 6*d.*

Here are eight studies by an American Professor of History, dealing with as many phases of British Labour history, all, except the first, subsequent to 1914. They illustrate very well both the merits and the defects of current history, written mainly out of periodicals and reports, by a careful student who knows the general political background of his subject, but lacks the intimate acquaintance with its events and personalities needed for successful placing of things in their correct order of significance and practical importance. Professor Brand has studied assiduously some, but not all, of the Labour and Socialist periodicals; he has raked through the reports of the Labour Party, the Trades Union Congress, the Independent Labour Party, and the Communist Party; he has unearthed the details of the quarrels between the rival Internationals after 1918, and between the Labour Party and the Communists over the twenty years before 1939. Any student who wants a careful record of these disputes, a summary of successive Labour pronouncements on War Aims in the course of the last war, or a record of votes cast on important issues related to these matters at successive Conferences of the Labour Party and the Trade Unions, will find in this book a great deal that is useful. He is a chronicler, and not a historian; and his chronicle has all the limitations of the 'research' made by someone who is neither enough of an insider to make his chronicle a living document, nor enough of an outsider to take a balanced and objective view. In particular, the effect of the newspapers which Professor Brand has studied most assiduously is to overweight his narrative with material derived from I.L.P. sources (he has made comparatively little use of George Lansbury's *Herald*, and appears not to understand its position), and also to give the always small and never influential British Socialist Party an altogether undue prominence.

Of the eight studies, the first purports to deal with the conversion of the Trade Unions to political action. But it deals in fact only with one phase of this conversion—that of the Reform movement of the 1860's. From this point Professor Brand skips over nearly half a century, which includes the period during which this conversion really took place and first the I.L.P. and then the Labour Party were formed. He comes straight to a study of Labour's part in the Coalition Governments of the last war, and thence to a series of essays on Labour's Peace Aims, Labour's reaction to President Wilson's Fourteen Points, the war-time history of the Labour Internationals, and kindred questions; and thence again to his post-war studies of the rebuilding of the Internationals and of the troubled course of relations between Social Democracy and Communism in the world between the wars. The title of his book is thus really a misnomer; for he does not study Labour's rise to power, but only certain incidents related to it. There is, for example, hardly anything about the Labour Governments of 1924 and 1929, or about the effects of the General Strike of 1926 on Labour's political or industrial position.

The plain truth is that the details of the Labour Party's bickerings with the Communists, or of the manœuvres of the rival Internationals after the last war, are

profoundly uninteresting unless they are interpreted as well as chronicled. It would make a most interesting study to try to find out exactly why the British Labour Party and the Trades Union Congress, after quarrelling most vehemently with the German Social Democrats during the last war, became so speedily their allies in the post-war Second International, against the parties, such as the French and Italian, which stood a good deal further to the left. It would be exciting, as well as important, to discover why the Communists made so much less impression on the British Labour movement after 1917 than on almost any other national section of the Labour 'International.' It would be well worth while to analyse both the objective forces and the personalities behind the various movements, and to attempt to estimate their relative influence. But these tasks are not for Professor Brand, who thinks he has done his job when he has correctly copied out the resolutions and set the merely external events before his readers in due order.

G. D. H. Cole.

PROBLEMS OF THE DANUBE BASIN, by C. A. Macartney. *Cambridge University Press.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

The problem of the Danube Basin is only a segment of "that shifting intractable and interwoven tangle of conflicting interests, rival peoples, and antagonistic faiths that is veiled" as John Morley once said "under the easy name of the Eastern Question." But it is an important segment and certainly not the least complicated.

No one is better qualified to unravel the tangles than Mr. Macartney who is possessed not only of great learning, but considerable

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practical experience. Yet this book is, in some degree disappointing, the more so as the introductory chapter is as brilliant as anything I ever read on this subject. My main criticism of the book is that Mr. Macartney pre-supposes a much greater knowledge of the subject than the average reader of this series is likely to possess. Or does he take for granted that his readers, using his book as a starting point, will have the industry and patience to expand his highly concentrated essence for themselves?

The truth is—paradoxical though it may sound—that the smaller the canvas the bigger ought to be the brush wherewith you paint. Otherwise you overcrowd the picture with detail and fail to make it as a whole intelligible. Again, the more concentrated the narrative the greater the necessity for perfect lucidity of style. This canon also Mr. Macartney fails to satisfy. Again and again I have found it necessary to reread a sentence or a paragraph more than once before I could be certain of its meaning. So rapid, indeed, is Mr. Macartney's thought, so elliptical his style, that some of his statements seem (to duller minds) hardly consistent with each other. For instance: from page 40 I learn that it was the "steady aim" of the Habsburgs "to break down all popular institutions and to transform its patrimony into a centralized, unified and autocratically ruled whole." On page 42 the Habsburgs "had no wish and never tried to change the national individualities, as such, of their subjects." But on page 43 the object of the Habsburgs was "to reduce all national feeling to a common level, to extirpate from anywhere any feelings except that of attachment to the dynasty." Doubtless Mr. Macartney would have made all this clear enough if he had not been compelled to such rigid compression. But what in the meantime, is the inexpert reader to conclude was in fact the Habsburg policy?

Once more. In reference to the Compromise of 1867 between Austria and Hungary Mr. Macartney writes: Bitterly as the Compromise was attacked, it cannot justly be called an immoral arrangement" (page 101). That leaves one reader puzzled as to why the *Ausgleich* ever should have been criticized as "immoral." But let me desist from criticism of details which in the interests of the ordinary reader I feel constrained to make. I hasten to add that the little book is full of "good stuff" on subjects with which it is the duty of every intelligent citizen to inform himself.

Personally, I have never ceased to regret the collapse of the Habsburg Empire. Palacky, the great Czech statesman and historian declared in 1866: "If the Austrian Empire had not existed of old it would have been necessary in the interests of Europe and of humanity to create it." "Ramshackle" in some senses it may have been: but it was an immense convenience. With two of Mr. Macartney's conclusions, then, I cordially agree that "the maintenance of the security and stability of the Danubian area is a vital interest of the whole world," and that "some form of association for common defence entailing necessarily a degree of common foreign policy is indispensable for the security" (of the Danubian States).

J. A. R. Marriott

THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND THE FUTURE, by Donald Hughes. *Cambridge University Press.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

There has been a great deal of criticism of the Public Schools in recent times. Most of it is from those who can see no good in the Public School system and would sweep it away altogether. The attacks of these critics are of little value since they ignore the tremendous contributions which the Public Schools have made to this country's history. In this book there is a reasoned and sincere belief in their future and a constructive scheme for correcting their faults and preserving their virtues.

One of the difficulties in discussing this subject is to find a satisfactory definition in answer to the question "What constitutes a Public School?" In a recent letter to *The Times*, the Headmaster of Winchester points out that "the contrast is not between the secondary and the public schools but between day and boarding schools."

It is of the boarding school system that Mr. Hughes writes, believing that its very great advantages justify its much greater cost; he is sure that more self-reliance and confidence are found in the boarder and that there is a far deeper "sense of belonging to a community and of the obligation to be loyal to something other than himself." The book is not for this reason an attack on the day school: the best day schools seem really to be those which have assimilated as far as possible the boarding-school system.

The author's one really adverse criticism of the boarding schools is their general aimlessness, the solution to which is a far greater emphasis on religious training so that Christianity becomes so live an interest that it's importance in boys'

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lives supplants the present aim, as often as not the mere winning of 1st XV colours.

If we accept the principle that the Boarding School has more to offer by its very corporate existence as a community than any other form of educational system, then we must ensure that these schools are in reality made Public and that the question of admission is decided not merely on financial grounds but on whether the boy is intelligent enough to profit from further education. To throw open the present Public Schools to unrestricted competition by examination only to boys who would be maintained at State expense would defeat its own object since so revolutionary a proposal would destroy at once the characteristics of the Public School as it is. Equally has it been rightly pointed out that merely to open a few places to state scholars at each school would meet neither social nor financial difficulties.

Mr. Hughes would meet both by maintaining 60 per cent. of the places for those who would enter in the normal course of events and 40 per cent. for boys chosen on merit who would be paid for by the State. He supports this suggestion by arguing that the schools must retain a considerable proportion of normal admissions in order to retain their character and independence, while the introduction of so large a number of State scholars would ensure that they would not feel isolated among strangers.

When all are under a common discipline and engaged on the same tasks and interests, there would be a real sense of belonging to one community and any feeling of class would quickly disappear: certainly such a common aim would dispel the make-believe atmosphere which is found in so many holiday camps and similar organized parties whe it is not really possible, even wi the best intentions, that the min ling of classes should be on eq terms.

Mr. Hughes has also many sou and provocative things to say abo all other manner of things; he particularly good on the teaching Shakespeare for School Certificat he is ready to retain corporal pu ishment but would abolish faggin and he has some wise things to s on the abuse of athleticism. T whole book is well-balanced ar stimulating and deserves to be re by all who have taken an interest i the many discussions that hav taken place on the problem a those who have at heart the futu of our educational system.

J. F. BURNE

THE SPORTING QUEENS BERRYS, by The Tenth Mar quess of Queensberry. *Hutchinso* 15*s.*

During the month when Com mander Stephen King-Hall and Mr Vernon Bartlett, two Members o Parliament who, more than most have made a profession out of th Man in the Street, call loudly fo an end to be made to pleasure especially of the ring and the race course, it is pleasant to find tha Lord Queensberry estimates the ring as equal to all the other activi ties of life put together. Each chapter of his book is given half to the ring and half to the rest: even when history is found to move faster than pugilism, so that the mind has to make a considerable temporal adjustment in the middle of every "Round."

Through the second part of each "Round" pass all the boxers who ever achieved fame; with a pressure of gory and shady anecdote that threatens to overwhelm the chroni-

cles of the house of Douglas, and promises to provide material for an indefinite number of further volumes. Two important constructive suggestions emerge. Lord Queensberry is one of the many who consider that every title contest should be fought to a finish, and maintains the view, not infrequently encountered, that "Tunney did not deserve the victory which came to him from the hands of the referee at the end of his ten rounds with Dempsey in Philadelphia." Of course, Tunney's contemptuous attitude to professional pugilism was highly disruptive of what may be called 'million dollar gate morale'! Lord Queensberry would also impose restraint on the "minor operations" performed in the corner of the ring, such as pouring caustic into an open wound, and opening a swollen eye with a razor blade. The squeamish may be consoled to learn that "I have the word of scores of boxers that to be knocked out is entirely painless, and leaves the victim perfectly capable of continuing the contest as soon as consciousness returns."

Lord Queensberry is neither historian nor stylist; and his account of the wild Douglases is as disappointing as was Mr. Bernard Falk's of the mad Seymour-Conways. Both Lord Queensberry and Mr. Falk start with Old Q: but Lord Queensberry equally fails to bring him to life.

On the Eighth Marquess of Queensberry somewhat more light is thrown. This strange man not only formulated the famous Rules (which are here set forth in full, both original and present drafts) at the age of twenty-two, but, at the same age, succeeded in winning general support for them from the anti-English and anti-aristocratic Irish-American boxing promoters of the 'seventies. He also founded the present system of weight distinctions. Equally important, of course, is the fact that he was mainly responsible for the downfall and destruction of the potentially greatest writer of English comedy since Ben Jonson. Lord Queensberry's information on page 172 about his uncle, Lord Alfred Douglas's works, and the literature of the Wilde cult generally, is comically inexact and inadequate.

Lord Queensberry's father, though he discovered the Canadian nickel deposits, as well as several remarkable gold mines, consumed £300,000 in eighteen months, and died penniless. His funeral was attended by a vast concourse of the needy, obscure, and afflicted. Perhaps the best thing in the book is Lord Queensberry's detailed account of the miseries of life at Harrow on two shillings a week pocket money.

On page 44 there is a delightful misprint (among others):—"George IV. would not have tolerated in his entourage anyone whose character was so much as tinged with dissolute tendencies."

The history of the Douglases, as of the Seymour-Conways, remains to be written.

ROBERT FORDYCE AICKMAN.

ENGLISH WOODLAND, by John Rodgers. *Batsford.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

ALPINES I HAVE GROWN, by Russell Leslie. *Drummond.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

In his preface, Mr. Rodgers explains that war conditions made it impossible for him "to revisit the woods that have charmed me so often." He therefore had to rely on his memory and on his books. His memory must have been well-stored and his books have enabled him to amplify his text with generous quotations from the novelists and the poets. From Epping and Wychwood and the Forest of Dean

in the south to Inglewood and the Forest of Rothbury in the north, he has omitted none of the more considerable woodlands of this country, and his enthusiasm is infectious. This is all to the good, especially at a time when the demands of war are once again depleting this important (though underestimated) part of our national heritage. Something will have been achieved if Mr. Rodgers's book should awaken zeal for the beauty of our dwindling woodlands. Nevertheless, when the last word has been said about their beauty (and there is plenty to say) the uncomfortable fact remains that England is the most deplorably afforested country in Europe; and how much more Mr. Rodgers might have achieved if he had gone on to stiffen that zeal with indignation at the way in which the more utilitarian aspects of our woodlands have been, and still are being, neglected?

Whatever attempts are made after the war to reorganize our rural life and agriculture upon a healthy basis will have to take afforestation very seriously into account. Life is one and indivisible: the health of the land is a measure of the health of the people who live on it. And the health of the land is conditioned in no inconsiderable manner by the state of its woodlands. It is of no use in the long run, for instance, to spend vast sums on reclamation, on the conversion of pasture to plough, and on increased food production all over the country, if at the same time we deplete our already insufficient woodlands and take no steps—or even take inadequate steps—to plant where we have felled. Restoration of fertility will have to be the basis of any future land policy in England; but that policy is doomed in advance unless felling is accompanied by equivalent planting.

Mr. Rodgers commends, along with Jubilee Oaks, a suggestion recently put forward in *The Times* to the effect that, instead of sending a wreath to a funeral, we should plant a tree in memory of the dead; but such well-meaning contributions are a mere drop in the ocean. Even the work of the Forestry Commission is altogether inadequate at present to meet the growing need. Nor can that work have any lasting or satisfactory outcome so long as the guiding principle of the Commission remains what it apparently is to-day, namely, a consideration for the commercial value of the kind of trees used for planting. Regimented acres of conifers all over the country would still leave the problem unsolved. Mr. Rodgers himself cites an instance from East Poland, where, he says, "the pine trees died of blight, because the birds left the woods when the broad-leaved trees were felled." Similarly, no attempts at re-afforestation in England can be of any permanent value while, as was the case during the year 1937-1938, 11,000 acres of conifers are planted as against 2,500 acres of broad-leaved trees.

It is a pity therefore that *English Woodland* should devote no more than one chapter (of five pages only) to this all-important aspect of its subject. Woodland flora and fauna, too, are only mentioned in passing, and more might have been said about the various wood-crafts which are surely integral to the theme. Folk-lore and legend are briefly touched upon and Mr. Rodgers is extremely well-informed on the history of our forests. Finally, it almost goes without saying that the book is well illustrated, though it must be confessed that photographs of trees, and very little else but trees, tend to pall long before the publishers' generous allowance of a hundred has been exhausted . . . . Of Mr. Leslie's book there is little to say. The

thirty or so wood-engravings, which are the reason for the brief, informative text, are charming, though they suffer both from the war-time paper on which they are printed and from a certain heaviness in the design. If there still remains anybody, in these unaccommodating times, able to console himself with the cultivation of alpines, he should nevertheless add this little book to his library.

C. HENRY WARREN.

THE SOLITARY MAN AND OTHER POEMS, by Richard Church. *Dent.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

THE BURIED STREAM. COLLECTED POEMS 1908 to 1940, by Geoffrey Faber. *Faber & Faber.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

GAUTAMA THE ENLIGHTENED AND OTHER VERSE, by John Masefield. *Heinemann.* 5*s.*

Mr. Richard Church, by long apprenticeship and patient integrity, has brought his art to a point of perfection. On the strength of his new book alone, attractively produced in a limited edition, Mr. Church would have to be considered an important poet, with the best of his generation still writing, Edmund Blunden, V. Sackville-West, T. S. Eliot, Robert Graves. For in *The Solitary Man,* a book that moved me deeply, he has, "life's discipline grown fruitful," with "slow words most deliberately planned" given us an artistic statement that nobody else could have given. If he commands no sweeping, compelling music, his use of half-rhyme and subtle cadence much attract an attentive ear; which, above all, reflect his predominant mood—pain. There is a poignant intimacy about these poems which are full of images of martyrdom, a severely harnessed personal note—one thinks of Emily Dickinson—yet this is a *sweet* austerity. Ripeness is all, and something of the mellowness of



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light in Keats's *Ode to Autumn* is over certain passages, for example in the sonnet *Late Love* and in *A Gardener's Farewell.* Yet generally for Mr. Church

> Grief is articulate, but joy
> Is a dumbfounded boy.
>
> He is dumb, he has nothing to say.

The theme, personal and philosophic, of *The Solitary Man* is the agony of war and the war between good and evil, expressed in "grieving rhythms" and in places with a "stabbing agony," but always symbolically, poetically. He sees

> Poor Shakespeare with a bullet in his throat,
>
> And a scarred Cross, the relic of a Faith.

But he has his solution, his poet's answer:

> And think again, if an armed man
> Shall desecrate your house,
> In a few years that noise will sound
> Like a foraging mouse.

It might be misleading to select for particular emphasis titles from the many fine poems in this book, but I feel confident that Mr. Church's muse would make a comfortable ninth beside the eight which he has destined recently for immortality.

A careful reading through Mr. Geoffrey Faber's *Collected Poems* brings with it a respectful sympathy for a brave and idealistic spirit. It is possible that this record of a soul's pilgrimage through chaos to chaos has more of a religious than an intrinsically poetic value, and the poems inspired by religious passion are perhaps the best, for example *Cowardice* and *O Greater Than Greatness.* For Mr. Faber reveals a soul seared by the last war and dreams broken. Although his book is by no means without literary echoes, he somehow manages to preserve the integrity of what he has to say. Generally speaking the longer poems and those written i freer metres are the most success ful, for elsewhere he sometime shows a badly defective ear, lik Donne who "for not keeping accent, deserved hanging"! B many of the poems in the secon half of the book are good, to choo at random *Memorial to Micha Lawrence, In Piam Memoria Welsh Inn Parlour,* and *Dark Rive* I have no space here to take up t gauntlet thrown down in M Faber's over-modest Preface, e cept to say that he ignores t truism of *plus ça change* . . . The does not seem to me to have be so great a break in tradition as postulates. Nor can I agree th the sonnet is, or is likely to *démodé,* but suggest that it will co tinue to flourish as obstinately England as cricket.

In *Gautama The Enlightened a Other Verse* Mr. Masefield tal delightful holiday. In the tit poem the motive springs from which is true spirituality. El where

> Art is the Sun which shines.

If these four longish poems l some of the vitality of the e work, the story-teller is in g evidence. *Shopping In Oxford* vites comparison with another po on a similar theme, *Miss Thomp Goes Shopping* by Martin A strong. They should both be r aloud, and the palm award There is some good descrip writing in the ballad, *Mahdar Quest*:

> Up, from the brake, the wild-
> scuttered,
> Up, in a V, into the sky.
> The river wimpled, the reeds flutt
> The reed-birds breathed their war
> cry.

Admirers of Mr. Masefield will joy themselves here.

JOSEPH BRADE

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